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Abstract 
Australia's economy has shown resilience and flexibility to deal with challenges over the past 
century. Krugman (1997) has claimed that the long run growth of a country is almost entirely 
dependent on productivity. The subject of this thesis is total factor productivity (TFP), which 
is based on the neoclassical growth model pioneered by Solow (1956). This thesis has two 
objectives. The first is to review the literature on the Solow growth model. The second is to 
empirically estimate TFP growth in Australia from 1960 to 2010 and in doing so, attempt to 
update the literature. The results suggest Australia experienced a decline in productivity 
growth during the latter half of the 2000s, however, policy makers recognise the challenges 
facing the economy.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Krugman (1997, p. 11) claims that "Productivity isn't everything, but in the long run it is 
almost everything". If we are to take this quote as being literally true, it is little wonder that 
productivity growth has been the focus of Australian policy makers (Banks, 2010; The 
Treasury 2010). Australia navigated the global financial crisis from a position of strength; 
however, the country's productivity growth declined in the 2000s (House Standing 
Committee on Economics, 2010; Eslake and Walsh, 2011). The aim of this thesis is twofold. 
The first is to present a literature review on the Solow growth model. The second is to 
provide an account of total factor productivity growth (TFP) using growth accounting in 
Australia from 1960 to 2010. In providing an account for TFP growth in Australia over five 
decades, this thesis will attempt to update the literature on productivity growth for Australia.  
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 is arranged in two sections. The first 
section of Chapter 2 will give an exposition of the neoclassical growth model developed by 
Solow (1956) and Swan (1956). The motivation for constructing the neoclassical growth 
model by Solow (1956) will be explored by investigating the foundations of the Harrod-
Domar model. Rather than basing growth on a set of rigid assumptions, where a country's 
steady state growth is on knife edged balance, the neoclassical growth model's steady state is 
dynamic, that is, growth converges toward a steady state. The second section of Chapter 2 is 
a review of the literature on the neoclassical growth model beginning with examining the 
Solow growth model as a parable. Secondly, the Cambridge capital controversy highlighted 
issues surrounding the aggregation of capital and its subsequent application in growth theory. 
Thirdly, the debate on convergence is covered. Several authors (Baumol, 1986; Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992) found evidence of conditional 
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convergence, whilst others (Abramovitz, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; 
Solow, 2000), reported divergence instead. The failure to account for convergence led to a 
focus on TFP as a predictor of growth. There are two interpretations of TFP, the 
accumulationists and assimilationists. The final section of Chapter 2 will examine the 
neoclassical growth model in the context of new growth theory.  
 
Chapter 3 examines three inputs from the Solow growth model in order to determine TFP 
from an Australian perspective. The inputs covered are gross domestic product (GDP), capital 
and labour from 1960 to 2010. We will see how Australia's GDP growth, with a few 
exceptions, has generally been strong over the five decades. In terms of capital, the trend has 
been increasing capital deepening, especially from the mid-2000s. Like GDP and capital 
growth, the Australian labour market has generally been robust in the face of extensive 
structural change.  
 
Chapter 4 is the heart of the thesis and is divided into three sections. This chapter begins with 
a review of the literature on Australia's productivity growth from 1960 to 2010. We will see 
that although Australia suffers from the "tyranny of distance", when geographic difficulties 
are accounted for the country's productivity performance is relatively strong. The second 
section of this chapter will examine the trends in Australia's TFP growth from 1960 to 2010 
following the growth accounting method of Kehoe and Prescott (2002). The final section of 
the chapter concludes the policy implications of Australia's productivity performance. 
Consideration is also given to factors outside of productivity which may have an impact on 
the long term growth rate. Chapter 5 is the concluding chapter, reviewing the findings of the 
thesis and the implications these results have with regard to policy makers.  
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Chapter 2: Neoclassical Growth Theory 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first is to provide a brief overview of the 
neoclassical growth model.  The second is to give a literature review. The Solow growth 
model is thought of as the "starting point" for any analysis of growth, even amongst models 
which deviate substantially from this theory (Romer, 2006, p. 7). The neoclassical growth 
model is "designed to show how growth in the capital stock, growth in the labour force and 
advances in technology interact in an economy and how they affect a nation's total output of 
goods and services" (Mankiw, 2007, p. 187).  
 
In the first section of the chapter, we begin with an examination of the role the Harrod-Domar 
(Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946) theory of growth had on the development of neoclassical 
growth theory. Accordingly, if an economy were to stumble upon a steady state, this would 
be inherently unstable. The Solow growth model (1956) rejects this proposition and finds 
instead that a steady state can be stable and that an economy would tend toward this point. 
These are the foundations upon which the neoclassical growth model is built. From this, it is 
possible to build a model for long run growth in a series of steps, examining factor inputs that 
determine the growth path of an economy. These are capital (K), labour (L) and technology 
(A), a residual derived from the sum of the effectiveness of labour and capital. After an 
understanding of the basics of the model have been covered, it is possible to review the effect 
a change in the savings rate has on output and consumption. Broadening the focus on 
consumption, the Golden Rule of capital in determining the optimum savings rate for the 
welfare of society is examined.  
4 
 
Growth theory has experienced a revival since the 1980s. The development of new growth 
theories led to an "astonishing burst of theoretical and empirical research that still continues" 
(Solow, 2000, p. 97). Even though the development of endogenous growth theory renewed 
interest in this field, old growth theory (Solow growth model) has not been left behind. On 
the contrary, there has been a wealth of empirical research in the last three decades on the 
applicability of the Solow growth model in the real world.  
 
The focus of the second section is to review debates involving the theoretical and empirical 
applicability of the Solow (1956) growth model. The first part of this section focuses on 
Kaldor's six "stylised facts" of growth. Second is a discussion of the Cambridge capital 
controversy. Although an old debate, the controversy does highlight some of the limitations 
of the neoclassical growth model regarding capital. Third, is the extensive literature on 
convergence, where significant disagreement exists about the presence and extent of this 
growth phenomenon. The Fourth debate examined focuses on accumulation and assimilation 
theories of capital in light of the East Asia growth miracle. The final segment of this chapter 
outlines neoclassical growth theory in the context of endogenous models of growth. Before 
those debates are covered, it is important to gain an understanding of the neoclassical growth 
model.  
 
Harrod-Domar: Beginnings of the Neoclassical Growth Model 
One of the primary reasons for the development of the neoclassical growth model is to 
address the shortfalls or limitations found in the Harrod-Domar model of economic growth. 
The Harrod-Domar model made a "crucial" assumption that production takes place under 
fixed proportions, allowing no substitution between capital and labour (Solow, 1956, p. 65). 
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This assumption leads to an unsatisfactory conclusion (Solow, 1956). According to the 
Harrod-Domar model, even in the long run, if the economy were to find itself on an 
equilibrium growth path, it would by no means be stable (Solow, 1956). The consequence of 
a change in the primary parameters would be perilous. If the savings rate, the capital-output 
ratio or the rate of increase in the labour force change, this may either lead to growing 
unemployment or prolonged inflation (Solow, 2000).  
 
Solow (1956), in modifying the Harrod-Domar model rejected the assumption of fixed 
proportions of factor inputs. Solow (1956) relaxed that assumption by allowing the 
substitution of capital and labour to take place. Removing this assumption means the knife-
edge balance an economy may find itself in, would no longer be apply. Rather the steady-
state would be inherently stable, a key tenet of the neoclassical growth model.  
 
The Neoclassical Growth Model 
The neoclassical model of growth describes an economy at each stage of time where there is 
some growth from a set of initial, known conditions (Novales, Fernández & Ruíz, 2010). In 
keeping the analysis simple, governments are left out of the analysis. The model only has 
three inputs, capital (K), labour (L) and technology (A). Technological progress (A) is 
captured by the sum productivity (or effectiveness) of labour and capital. At any point in time 
these inputs combine to produce only a single commodity, output (Y) (Romer, 2006, p. 9). 
The production function takes the form: 
                      , (2.1) 
where t denotes time. As we can see time only enters the production function through the 
inputs K, L and A. This means output only changes when the inputs in the production 
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function change (Romer, 2006, p. 9). Given quantities of labour and capital will also produce 
a greater amount of output if there is technological progress (Romer 2006, p. 9). 
 
From the production function in (2.1) it is evident that A and L enter multiplicatively (Romer, 
2006, p. 9).  AL is known as effective labour, which takes into account the number of workers 
and the efficiency of workers (Mankiw, 2007, p. 217). Technology that enters the production 
function in this way is known as labour-augmenting or Harrod-neutral (Romer, 2006, p. 9). 
Allowing A to be labour augmenting when combined with the other assumptions of the model 
implies that the capital-output ratio, K/Y, eventually settles down (Romer, 2006, p. 9). The 
ability for K/Y to settle down serves two purposes; first, it is consistent with points three and 
four of Kaldor's "stylised facts"
1
, secondly, this makes the analysis much easier (Romer, 
2006, p. 9). We now turn our attention to the assumptions underpinning the evolution of the 
three inputs, capital, labour and technology in the production function.  
 
The Solow growth model assumes that the production function is homogeneous to the first 
degree (Novales et al., 2010, p. 60). Setting constant returns to scale constitutes two 
assumptions about the model. Firstly, we assume the economy to be large enough that all 
gains from specialisation have been exhausted; a doubling of inputs does not lead to more 
than double the volume of output (Romer, 2006, p. 10). Secondly, there is no "scarce 
nonaugmentable resource" like land (Solow, 1956, p. 67). If land were to enter the model, the 
constant returns to scale assumption would no longer apply, in fact there would be decreasing 
returns to scale and the model would become more Ricardian (Solow, 1956, p. 67). 
Mathematically, we multiply both sides by any nonnegative constant c to show that output 
will change by the same factor (Romer, 2006, p. 10): 
                                                          
1
 These "stylised facts" are covered in detail on p. 23. 
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                                      (2.2) 
 
The assumption of constant returns allows us to analyse the production function in intensive 
form. This means the variables in the neoclassical growth model can be analysed relative to 
the size of the labour force (Mankiw, 2007, p. 188). Setting        in equation (2.2) gives 
(Romer, 2006, p. 10): 
   
 
  
     
 
  
         (2.3) 
Equation (2.3) shows that the amount of output per effective worker F(K, AL)/AL is a 
function of the amount of capital per effective labour     . Constant returns to scale mean 
that the size of the economy, here measured by the number of workers, does not affect the 
relationship between output per capita and the capital-labour ratio (Mankiw, 2007, p. 188). 
As the size of the economy does not matter, we can proceed in our analysis by designating all 
quantities in per worker terms, thus setting        and        allows us to write the 
production function as (Mankiw, 2007, p. 188)  
 
        (2.4) 
Equation (2.4) shows that the output per unit of effective labour is a function of capital per 
unit of effective labour.  
 
Figure 2.1 shows the production function of equation (2.4). It is evident that as the amount of 
capital increases, decreasing returns to scale begin to set in. That is, the production function 
     is assumed to satisfy                        . The assumption that       is 
positive and        is negative demonstrate that the marginal product of capital is positive but 
that it declines as capital per unit of effective labour rises (Romer, 2006, p. 11). The marginal 
product of capital is assumed to be high when k is low as each worker only has very little 
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capital to work with, thus each additional unit of capital is very useful. However, when k is 
high each worker has plenty of capital to work with, each additional unit of capital increases 
output slightly (Mankiw, 2007). In addition, the function is assumed to satisfy the Inada 
conditions (Romer, 2006, p. 11):               and               , these conditions 
are represented by Figure 2.1.
2
  
 
Figure 2.1: The Production Function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mankiw, 2007, p. 189. 
 
 The Evolution of Inputs in the Production Function 
Now that an understanding of the key ratios involved with the production function have been 
established, we can turn our attention to how the inputs, labour, technology and capital 
evolve. The Solow growth model is set in continuous time, where the variables of the model 
are defined at every point of time (Romer, 2006). We begin with the growth rates of labour 
and technology. Both of these variables grow at a constant rate (Romer, 2006, p. 12): 
                                                          
2
 These assumptions are consistent with a Cobb-Douglas production function (Novales et al., 2010). 
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             (2.5) 
 
             (2.6) 
where n and g are exogenous parameters. With regard to L, Solow (1956, p. 67) proceeds in 
the spirit of the Harrod-Domar model. Whereas L stood for total employment in equation 
(1.1), L in (2.5) stands for the available supply of labour or the participation rate. Thus, by 
identifying both, we assume that full employment is eternally maintained. This does not mean 
there is no unemployment in the model, the key assumption is that the unemployment rate is 
constant (Barro, 2008).  
 
Since we are considering growth rates of variables, it is important to note that the growth rate 
of a variable equals the growth rate of its natural log (Romer, 2006, p. 13). Applying this 
result to (2.5) and (2.6) tells us that the rates of change of the variables A and L is constant 
and equal to n and g  respectively. Therefore,  
 
                    (2.7) 
 
                     (2.8) 
where      and      are the values of both variables at time 0. Exponentiating both sides of 
(2.7) and (2.8) gives us 
 
              (2.9) 
 
              (2.10) 
Thus, the assumption is that   and   grow exponentially (Romer, 2006, p. 13). 
 
Thus far the growth of inputs   and   have been examined, we can now turn our attention to 
 . As mentioned previously, the neoclassical growth model produces one commodity, output, 
whose rate of production is      (Solow, 1956). A constant proportion of output is assumed 
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to be invested and saved (Taylor, 2007). The proportion of output saved is exogenous and 
constant (Romer, 2006). The fraction of output saved is      , while the economy's stock of 
capital      is the accumulation of the composite commodity (Solow, 1956). Net investment 
is therefore the rate of increase of the capital stock,   . One unit of output,  , devoted to 
investment yields one unit of new capital (Taylor, 2007, p. 11). It is also assumed that capital 
depreciates at a constant rate,   (Romer, 2006, p. 13). Therefore,   is given by (Taylor, 2007, 
p. 11): 
       
  
  
              (2.11) 
 
Dynamics of the Model 
As we have seen in the preceding section, the growth of   and   are exogenous. Therefore, to 
characterise the growth path of an economy we to turn to the third input, capital (Romer, 
2006). Since the economy may be growing over time, it is easier to focus on the capital per 
unit of effective labour ratio,  , than the unadjusted measure of the capital stock (Romer, 
2006). To do this we begin by dividing both sides of equation (2.11) by    (Taylor, 2007, p. 
11): 
 
     
        
 
     
        
 
     
        
  (2.12) 
Since we are now working in units of effective labour and given equation (1.4) states    , 
we are able to substitute (2.12) into (2.3) which gives (Taylor, 2007, p. 11): 
 
     
        
 
        
        
  
    
        
  (2.13) 
As mentioned previously,       , therefore it is now possible to substitute      into 
(1.13). Additionally, since the growth rates of labour and technology are   and  , the 
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expression         will become          (Taylor, 2007, p. 11). This gives the key 
equation of the Solow growth model (Romer, 2006, pp. 14-15):  
                             (2.14) 
 
Figure 2.2: The Solow Growth Model 
 
Source: Mankiw, 2007, p. 219. 
 
Equation (2.14) states the rate of growth of the capital stock per unit of effective labour. The 
first term of (2.14),      , is the actual investment per unit of effective labour; since 
      ,   represents the amount of total output saved for investment. The second term, 
        , represents the break-even investment. This is the amount of investment 
required to keep   at its existing level (Romer, 2007). Figure 2.2 illustrates equation (2.14). 
When the ray       lies above the break-even investment,         , the capital per unit 
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of effective labour ratio increases. This reflects the assumption that       is positive when the 
capital per unit of effective labour is small. 
 
As the economy continues to grow and the capital per unit of effective labour ratio continues 
to increase, the marginal product of capital begins to fall. This is reflected in the Inada 
conditions discussed previously, and means that the line       will eventually flatten and 
cross          (Romer 2006). This intersection is represented by   , when the economy 
reaches this point, it is said to be in a steady state where each of the variables in the model is 
growing at a constant rate (Mankiw, 2007). Mathematically (Novales et al., 2010, p. 64): 
 
                        (2.15) 
 
Furthermore, when the economy settles on the steady state, the rate of growth of output per 
worker is determined solely by the rate of technological progress (Romer, 2006). 
 If   exceeds   , then        is negative and the capital per unit of effective labour ratio will 
decline (Taylor, 2007, p. 12). Figure 2.3 demonstrates the growth path of   . When   is small 
the marginal product of capital is high, as this continues, however, the marginal product 
declines until    equals   . As Figures 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate, regardless of the starting 
point, an economy will eventually come to rest on a steady state (Taylor 2007).
3
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Solow (1956, pp. 70-73) considered other production functions where there are multiple steady states, rather 
than one inherently stable one as discussed. 
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Figure 2.3: The Growth Path of   
 
Source: Romer, 2006, p. 16. 
 
Effect of a Change in the Savings Rate  
From Equation (2.14) it is evident that an important parameter when determining the growth 
of the capital per unit of effective labour ratio is the savings rate. It is also the policy 
parameter which is most easily linked to policy intervention (Novales et al., 2010). As Romer 
(2006, p. 17) explains:  
The division of the government's purchases between consumption and investment good, the 
division of its revenues between taxes and borrowing, and its tax treatments of savings and 
investment are all likely to affect the fraction of output invested. 
 
Figure 2.4 demonstrates what happens when a change in the savings rate occurs. As the 
savings rate increases so does the rate of investment, demonstrated by the line       .  
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Although the savings rate has increased this does not move the economy immediately from 
the original steady-state     
 , to the higher     
 . Since the actual investment now exceeds 
the break-even investment, more resources are being assigned to keep   constant, therefore    
will begin to rise (Romer, 2006). As with the original growth path,          will eventually 
settle on the new steady-state,     
 , with a higher level of income, because       . 
Therefore, an increase in the rate of savings will only contribute to a temporary boost in    
before settling on a new steady-state, albeit with higher income (Mankiw, 2007).
4
  
 
Figure 2.4: The Effect of an Increase in the Savings Rate 
 
Source: Romer, 2006, p. 18. 
 
The transition to a higher savings rate and its effects on the economy can be seen in Figure 
2.5. Figure 2.5a shows a jump in the savings rate at   . This is reflected in Figure 2.5b, where 
                                                          
4
 The savings rate is also said to have a level effect, because the per capita income has been raised but not its 
growth rate. This is in contrast to a growth effect (from technology) which affects the growth rate of per capita 
output on the balanced growth path (Mankiw 2007, p. 196; Romer 2006, p. 19). 
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   is initially seen to benefit from increased savings, but then slowly declines back to the 
steady-state. Figure 2.5c demonstrates the income per unit of effective labour ratio increasing 
slightly and settling down at a higher permanent rate when    reaches its new steady state. In 
Figure 2.5d, the growth rate in per capita output receives a small boost, however, as is the 
case with   , eventually it settles down to a constant growth path once a steady state has been 
reached.  
 
Figure 2.5: The Effect of an Increase in the Savings Rate 
Figure 2.5a 
 
Figure 2.5b 
 
Figure 2.5c 
 
 
     
  
   
0      
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Figure 2.5d 
 
Figure 2.5e  
 
Figure 2.5f 
 
Source: Romer, 2006, p. 19. 
 
 
Effect on Consumption 
The previous section focused primarily on the changes which occur in output and investment 
once the savings rate has been changed. The savings rate can be thought of as a guide to the 
long term prosperity of an economy, since a higher savings rate increases output in the long 
run. If we introduced households to the model, it is evident that their welfare would not 
depend on a future value of production but on the level of consumption now (Romer, 2006).  
     
  
     
   
 
 
  
  
Growt
h Rate 
of     
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 As mentioned, the Solow growth model assumes the population saves a fraction of their 
output,  , and consumes the rest          (Mankiw, 2007). Therefore, consumption per 
unit of effective labour equals output per unit of effective labour,     , multiplied by the 
fraction of output which is consumed, which from the equation above is,     (Romer, 2006, 
p. 20). Figure 2.5f shows the effect a change in the savings rate has on the level of 
consumption. Since the savings rate changes immediately whilst   changes over time, the 
level of consumption at first declines as more output is saved for investment. However, as the 
economy adjusts on its new growth path,   begins to rise leading to an increase in the rate of 
consumption.  
 
Although consumption will begin to rise after an increase in the savings rate, it is not 
immediately clear if   will exceed its previous level. To find the level of consumption on the 
balanced growth path we denote   , as the steady state consumption per unit of effective 
labour.    is equal to      minus      . Since       is equal to the break-even investment, 
        , in a steady state,    is then (Romer, 2006, p. 20): 
                     (2.16) 
We can write               , since the steady state of   is determined by   and the 
parameters,     and   (Romer, 2006). The connotation of (2.16) is therefore (Romer, 2006, 
p. 20): 
 
   
  
                          
            
  
  (2.17) 
Since   determines   , it is now possible to calculate whether an increase in the savings rate 
has led to an increase in consumption.  
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The impact on consumption can be measured by the marginal product of capital,       , and 
whether it is higher or lower than       (Romer, 2006). If       is lower than     
 , then the additional output gained from an increase in the savings rate is not enough to 
maintain the capital stock at the new level. Therefore, consumption must be decreased in 
order to keep the economy at the steady state (Romer, 2006). This is shown in Figure 2.6a, 
where        is less than      . The high savings rate means that the economy has to 
sacrifice a large proportion of its consumption to maintain the level of capital. Figure 2.6b 
demonstrates the opposite, where        is higher than      . In this case a low savings 
rate has led to an increase in consumption as the amount of investment necessary to maintain 
the capital stock is not high.   
 
Figure 2.6a: Effect of a Change in the Savings Rate on Consumption (High Savings Rate) 
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Figure 2.6b: Effect of a Change in the Savings Rate on Consumption (Low Savings Rate) 
  
Source: Romer, 2006, p. 21. 
 
 The Golden Rule Level of Capital 
As shown in the previous section, adjustments in the savings rate can have implications on 
the ability of an economy to consume more or less. The question is then whether the welfare 
of the populace is better served by having a higher rate of saving with lower consumption or 
the opposite. Certainly, it may appear to be the case that having a high savings rate is 
preferable to a low one. This is not always true, and is demonstrated by the first panel of 
Figure 2.6. Although the economy has a higher growth rate and income, it is reinvesting a 
large proportion of output at the cost of consumption, and lowering the welfare of households 
(Mankiw, 2007).  
 
The Golden Rule level of capital is the optimal rate of saving which maximises the welfare of 
the populace.  It is the steady-state with the highest level of consumption, and is therefore the 
optimal level of capital which maximises the welfare in the economy (Vespignani, 2008). 
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The Golden Rule level of capital is welfare maximising, because individuals in an economy 
do not care about   or  . Rather, it is the amount of goods and services they can consume 
which is important (Mankiw, 2007).   
 
 To determine the Golden Rule level of capital, we must first determine the steady state 
consumption per worker. This has already been given in the form of equation (2.16). As 
mentioned before, an increase in the savings rate has two effects on equation (2.16). First, 
higher investment leads to a higher capital stock and therefore increased output. Secondly, 
with a higher capital stock, a greater percentage of output is required for investment due to 
depreciation (Mankiw, 2007). 
 
Figure 2.7 shows an economy on already at the Golden Rule level of capital. It is clear that if 
the capital stock is below the Golden Rule level, then an increase in the level of the capital 
stock will increase consumption. This is because raising the capital stock from this point 
increases output by a greater amount than depreciation. The opposite is true for a capital 
stock above the Golden Rule level, since output does not rise more than depreciation. Finally, 
at the Golden Rule level, the marginal product of capital and the line           are equal 
(Novales et al., 2010). The equation to determine the Golden Rule Level of capital is then 
(Novales et al., 2010, p. 75): 
             . (2.18) 
 
In the Golden Rule level, there are no transfers between labour and capital. If the capital 
stock is above the Golden Rule, it is not enough for just the capitalists to reinvest all the 
income they receive as the owners of capital. Workers are also required to sacrifice some of 
their income toward capital investment due to depreciation (Novales et al., 2010). 
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Conversely, a transfer from capital to labour occurs if the capital stock is below the Golden 
Rule level (Novales et al., 2010, p. 75).  
 
Although it is clear the Golden Rule level is the optimal steady state in terms of consumption, 
it is by no means the best allocation of resources. The Golden Rule level may only be the 
optimal allocation of resources if the economy is able to select the initial steady state. This is 
not the case, however, as mentioned before, the economy is endowed with certain structural 
parameters which determine the initial steady state. It may well be the case that the transition 
from the initial steady state to the Golden Rule level would incur too high a cost to 
consumption to justify an increase the savings rate across all time periods (Novales et al., 
2010). This does not apply to an economy which is situated above the Golden Rule level. In 
this situation, consumption is increased at all points in time along the transition path toward 
the Golden Rule level (Mankiw, 2007). 
Figure 2.7: Golden Rule Level of Capital 
 
Source: Mankiw, 2007, p. 201. 
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The Solow Growth Model as a Parable 
The Neoclassical growth model shown above may seem elegant; however, it is also important 
to take into account its limitations. Solow (2000, p. 1) describes the model as a "parable", we 
do not ask if it is literally true, but that the story is well told. In the same way, a theory of 
growth that is well told may have some limited applicability. The Solow growth model has 
simplified elements of the real world which we take for granted, but that may be too hard to 
model. Some examples of these simplifications are that:  
there is only a single good, government is absent; fluctuations in employment are ignored; 
production is described by an aggregate production function with just three inputs; and the 
rates of saving depreciation, population growth, and technological progress are constant 
(Romer, 2006, p. 13).  
Solow (2000, p. 2) readily acknowledges these problems. Simplifications inherent in the 
theory can lead to problems which the model may not solve. In some cases, the model 
appears to give answers, but instead propagates error (Solow, 2000). Nonetheless, situations 
where the assumptions in the model are able to give the correct answers, then the lack of 
realism can be seen as an aid through which we are able to understand the variables at play 
more easily (Romer, 2006, p. 14). It also helps to gain understanding of the generalised facts 
of economic growth the Solow growth model attempts to explain.  
 
Kaldor (cited Solow, 2000, p. 2) developed six "stylised facts" to describe what most of the 
theory of economic growth explains. These facts were designed to qualify what Kaldor felt 
"characterised the development of modern capitalist economies" (Harcourt, 2006, p. 114). 
They were broad empirical generalisations explaining the stability of capital-output ratios, the 
distribution of income and the rates of profit on capital over an extended period of time. 
Solow (2000, pp. 2-3) summarised these facts as follows:  
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1) Per capita output grows at a fairly constant rate over a long period of time 
2) The stock of real capital grows at a reasonably constant rate above the rate of growth 
of labour input 
3) The growth rate of output is similar to that of the growth of capital stock so that the 
output-capital ratio stays constant over time. 
4) The rate of profit on capital has a horizontal trend 
5) Per capita output can vary a lot from country to country 
6) Economies with a high ratio of profit tend to have a higher rate of investment to output. 
These "stylised facts" tend to be observed over long periods of time and are by no means 
accurate at every point (Solow, 2000; Harcourt, 2006). Solow (2000, pp. 3-4) describes an 
economy consistent with the first three points (and maybe four) as growing in a steady state. 
The capital-output ratio is constant and output, employment and the capital stock grow at a 
constant rate. As we can see, an explanation of growth is dependent on the interaction of 
variables such as capital and labour. It is important to note that there has been extensive 
debate over the aggregation of capital which came to be known as the Cambridge capital 
controversy. 
  
Cambridge Capital Controversy 
The focus of the controversy was on the aggregation of capital and whether this measurement 
was suitable for growth theory (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003, p. 200). Though growth theory 
has since moved on, it is beneficial to highlight the complexity of aggregating capital. As 
Robinson (cited Gram and Walsh, 1983, p. 524) explains: 
The short period means that capital is fixed in kind. You do not have to ask: When is capital 
not capital? because there is a specific list of blast furnaces and rolling stock and other hard 
objects, and for Marshall a given number of trawlers. In the long period capital equipment 
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changes in quantity and in design. So you come slap up to the question: What is the quantity 
of capital? 
Further criticism of the measurement aspects of the production function was voiced by 
Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) Granger (1997), Hunt (cited Taylor, 2007), Garegnani (1970) and 
Stiglitz (1996). Much of the debate in the Cambridge controversy revolves around marginal 
productivity.  
 
The strongest argument mounted against neoclassical growth theory was about reswitching 
and capital-reversing (Taylor, 2007). Supporters of this argument are Robinson (1953-54; 
1956; 1970), Sraffa (1962) and Garegnani (1970).  Reswitching and capital-reversing 
rendered the three key "parables" cited by Samuelson (cited Cohen and Harcourt, 2003) in 
the neoclassical model invalid.
5
 Reswitching occurs when the same technique, in this case a 
particular capital-labour ratio is preferred at two or more rates of interest, whilst other 
techniques are favoured in the intermediate rates. At a low rate of interest, "the cost 
minimising technique "switches" from   to   and then ("reswitches") back to  " (Cohen and 
Harcourt, 2003). This violates the first and second parables, since the same physical 
technique is associated with different rates of return. On the other hand, capital-reversing 
occurs when a lower capital-labour ratio is associated with a lower interest rate. Under this 
scenario, capital services have a lower price when there is a lack of supply in capital when 
comparing two steady state positions (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003). Therefore, we can say that 
the demand curve is not always downward sloping for capital, violating the second and third 
parables.  
                                                          
5
 The three parables are as follows: 1) The real return on capital is determined by the technical properties of 
the diminishing marginal productivity of capital; 2) a greater quantity of capital leads to a lower marginal 
product of capital and thus a lower rate of interest; 3) the distribution of income between labourers and 
capitalists is explained by the relative factor scarcities/supplies and marginal products (Cohen and Harcourt, 
2003, p. 201). 
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A defence of the neoclassical model was mounted by Solow (1955-56), Swan (1956) and 
Samuelson (1962). Solow questioned the need for a useful concept of capital in general, 
stating, "… if God had meant there to be more than two factors of production, He would have 
made it easier for us to draw three dimensional diagrams" (Solow, 1955-56, p. 101). 
However, Solow (1955-56, p. 108) noted that only in "very special cases" is it possible to 
find a definite measure of the capital stock. Nonetheless, he believed the one commodity 
model captured the essential features of the growth process (Solow, 1956; 2000). The end 
result of the debate was that Samuelson admitted, in heterogeneous models of capital, it was 
not unusual for reswitching and capital reversing to take place (Robinson, 1970). Hahn and 
Bliss (cited Cohen and Harcourt, 2003) also defended the neoclassical model in terms of 
general equilibrium theory. Robinson (1971, p. 600) countered by stating, "No one, 
presumably would claim that the statistics of modern industry depict an economy in 
equilibrium with perfect competition and correct foresight". There were, however, Cambridge 
economists such as Keynes (cited Taylor, 2007, p. 188) who believed it was possible to 
aggregate heterogeneous capital. According to Keynes (cited Taylor, 2007), assuming 
technical progress is embodied in capital enables the homogenisation of capital. This type of 
aggregation will be used in Chapter 4 to calculate capital stock for growth accounting.  
 
It is apparent that growth theory has moved on from these debates, particularly in light of the 
volume of work in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the Cambridge Controversy was never 
fully resolved, with both sides believing they had won the debate (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003, 
p. 207). Robinson (1971, p. 602) believed the English side of the debate had won, claiming 
"It seems then, that the controversy is over". On the other hand, Solow (2000, p. viii) claimed 
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he had become "trapped" in the controversy and that the whole episode was a "waste of time, 
a playing out of ideological games in the name of analytical economics". With the benefit of 
hindsight, Cohen and Harcourt (2003, p. 212) believe that the conflict has only been "buried", 
and predict that these questions will be raised again at some point in the future. Despite the 
controversy, academic research on the subject of economic growth has continued apace, 
where a considerable amount of research has focused on convergence. 
 
Convergence 
An implication of steady states in the Solow growth model is that countries with varying 
degrees of wealth will begin to converge. Convergence implies economies with similar 
population growth rates, production technologies and savings should transition to comparable 
levels of steady state income per unit of effective labour (Taylor, 2007). This analysis allows 
for more than one economy, and as before, they do not engage in international trade (Barro, 
2008). When studying convergence, much of the focus is on the variable  , and its transition 
to a new steady state (Barro, 2008).  
 
We have already seen how an economy naturally tends towards the steady state value,   . As 
such, it is important to understand how a steady state is determined. The effects of the 
variables on    are summarised in Table 2.1 below. The convergence hypothesis implies 
countries which have a lower capital per unit of effective labour ratio, and are therefore poor, 
grow faster during the transition period (Taylor, 2007, p. 19). This is reflected in Figure 2.8, 
where the poor economy at       is further from the steady state than the wealthier economy 
at      . Since both countries have equivalent values for the structural parameters, they are 
on the same growth path, and hence will eventually end up at   . Figure 2.9 plots  's 
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transition path for both economies, showing how both will eventually end up in the steady 
state,   . 
 
Table 2.1: Effects on Steady-State Capital per Worker,    
Increase in this Variable Effect on    
Saving Rate,   Increase 
Technology Level,   Increase 
Depreciation Rate,   Decrease 
Population Growth Rate,   Decrease 
Level of Labour Force,      No Effect 
Source: Barro, 2008, p. 80. 
 
Mathematically, the dynamics of convergence can be written as (Taylor, 2007, p. 20): 
     
  
 
 
     
 
          (2.19) 
where   is the growth rate. Equation (2.14) has been divided by   on both sides to give the 
above equation. Taking the derivative of    with respect to  , (2.19) then becomes (Taylor, 
2007, p. 20): 
 
   
  
 
                
 
    (2.20) 
The above equation implies that the lower the value of  , the higher the value of   . This 
means an economy which has a lower capital per unit of effective labour ratio, the higher the 
growth rate of that economy will be leading up to the steady state. The reason why a 
wealthier nation may experience slower growth than its poor rival is because of diminishing 
average product of capital,     (Barro, 2008). Therefore, the country with       in Figure 
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2.8 initially has a high average product of capital, allowing for stronger growth leading up to 
the steady state. Since the poor economies experience higher growth rates than their wealthier 
counterparts, it follows that convergence will occur. This is known as absolute or   
convergence. 
 
There are situations where the initial conditions in a group of countries differ, resulting in a 
failure of absolute convergence. However, when factors such as technology, population 
growth, and savings rates are accounted for, it is possible to observe conditional convergence 
(Taylor, 2007). One of the problems with the assumption of absolute convergence is the 
assumption that the determinants of   , were the same for all economies. Although this 
assumption may be reasonable for a sample of similar economies (such as the OECD), Barro 
(2008) believes it is less so for a broad sample of countries with differing endowments. The 
effect of having different endowments can be seen in Figure 2.10.
6
 Both economies have 
different savings rates unlike those in Figure 2.8. In Figure 2.10 we are not able to determine 
whether the distance between the      line and         curve is greater for economy 1 or 
2. The low value of      for economy 1 tends to make the distance greater; however, the 
lower savings rate tends to make the distance longer. These forces counteract each other, 
meaning that the distance to the steady state is likely to be similar for both countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 I have chosen to represent two economies with different savings rates in Figure 3.2. As Barro (2008, p. 87) 
notes, this is one possible difference in endowment, another is the population growth rate.  
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Figure 2.8: Absolute Convergence in the Solow Model 
 
Source: Barro, 2008, p. 80. 
Figure 2.9: Convergence and Transition Paths for Two Economies 
 
Source: Barro, 2008, p. 81. 
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Figure 2.10: Failure of  -Convergence in the Solow Model: Differences in the Savings Rates 
Source: Barro, 2008, p. 86. 
 
There has been a wealth of research into the convergence hypothesis in the last three decades. 
The research into this topic has fallen into two camps, those who believe economies around 
the world are converging in incomes and those who do not. We begin with those who make 
the case for convergence.  
 
The Case for Convergence 
As discussed before, two types of convergence have been identified. One is absolute or  -
convergence, the other is conditional or  -convergence (Taylor, 2007). Although  -
convergence has desirable outcomes, particularly for the poorer nations, there is little 
empirical evidence to support its claims (Taylor, 2007). Barro (1997) believes there is little 
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correlation between the growth rate and the initial level of real per capita GDP. According to 
his research, the correlation is slightly positive, indicating the rich are growing faster than the 
poor. This finding is supported by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) and Baumol (1986).
7
 
These results indicate some poor countries may be closer to their steady state than the rich, a 
reason for their slower growth. Even if convergence could be held in an absolute sense, 
Barro's (1997) research suggests the dispersion of per capita GDP may not narrow over time. 
It is possible for dispersion to persist because of independent shocks harming economic 
growth and therefore working against the equalising force of convergence. In light of the 
evidence, we can say that  -convergence does not exist, however, when certain factors are 
accounted for, one can make the case for conditional convergence (Taylor, 2007). 
 
Unlike absolute convergence, when factor inputs are taken into account there is empirical 
evidence to support conditional convergence. Maddison (cited Baumol, 1986) conducted a 
comprehensive analysis from 1870 to 1979. The study found evidence poor economies were 
converging with the rich (Taylor, 2007). Similar observations were made by Baumol (1986) 
using Maddison's data set. Table 2.2 is a compilation of 16 industrialised nations from 1870 
to 1979. The table shows how countries which could be considered rich (Australia) had 
grown the least when compared to those considered poor (Japan). This suggests that the 
convergence hypothesis may be correct. The data show almost perfect convergence for these 
countries with an            (Baumol, 1986). The rate of convergence according to Baumol 
(1986) has seen the gap in output per work-hour between the laggard (Japan) and the leader 
(Australia) drop from a factor of eight to around two (US and Japan). It is worth mentioning 
                                                          
7
 The assumption that a negative trend in inequality is directly associated with the poor growing faster than 
the rich is a fallacy according to Quah (1993, p. 435), Barro (1997, p. 11) and Hart (1995). This is called Galton's 
fallacy, where the mean of a sample (in this case y) may tend toward zero, however, the distribution of y, does 
not systematically narrow over time. 
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that this group of countries are industrialised, however, it was found that there is more than 
one "convergence club", there are three (Baumol, 1986).
8
  
Table 2.2: Total Growth from 1870 to 1979
a
 Productivity, GDP Per Capita, and Exports for 
Sixteen Industrialised Countries
b 
 Real GDP per Work 
Hour 
Real GDP per Capita Volume of Exports 
Australia 398 221 - 
United Kingdom 585 310 930 
Switzerland  830 471 4,400 
Belgium 887 439 6,250 
Netherlands 910 429 8,040 
Canada 1,050 766 9,860 
United States 1,080 693 9,240 
Denmark 1,098 684 6,750 
Italy 1,225 503 6,210 
Austria 1,270 643 4,740 
Germany 1,510 824 3,730 
Norway 1,560 873 7,740 
France 1,590 694 4,140 
Finland 1,710 1,016 6,240 
Sweden 2,060 1,083 5,070 
Japan 2,480 1,661 293,060 
Source: Baumol, 1986, p. 1074, 
a 
In 1970 US dollars, 
b
 Shown in percent. 
 
                                                          
8
 The three groups consist of the industrialised countries, centrally planned and intermediate countries and the 
poor less developed world.  
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Subsequent research by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991; 1992) focused on convergence 
amongst the states of the US. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) found a strong negative 
correlation (-0.93) between the average growth rate from 1880 to 1988 and the log of per 
capita income in 1880. The southern states with lower average per capita income experienced 
the fastest growth rates. Western states, with higher per capita incomes, had lower than 
average growth after 1880. The growth rates of the regions across the US demonstrate the 
capacity for economies which are further below the steady state to grow at a higher rate than 
the wealthy. The rate of convergence over this period was found to be around two percent a 
year, even when factors other than initial per capita GDP were held constant (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1991; 1992). Similar rates of convergence have been found in Canadian provinces, 
Japanese prefectures and regions of the main Western European nations (Barro, 1997, p. 17; 
Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Lee, 1996). 
 
Expanding focus to cross country growth, studies by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and 
Barro (1991; 1997) have shown evidence of conditional convergence. Mankiw et al. (1992) 
found the Solow growth model inadequate for determining cross country convergence. The 
estimated impact of saving and labour force growth are much larger than the model predicts. 
To overcome this problem, Mankiw et al. (1992) add human capital, which in 1969 
accounted for around half the total US capital stock. The production function then becomes 
(Mankiw et al., 1992, p. 416): 
 
                                (3.1) 
where H is the human capital stock, and all other variables are defined as before. Adding 
human capital produces results which strongly support the augmented Solow growth model 
(Mankiw et al., 1992, p. 421). This is especially the case when saving and population growth 
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are taken into account. Analysis from Barro (1991; 1997) supports the data from Mankiw et 
al. (1992). In addition, Barro (1997) found adding more years of school raised the sensitivity 
of growth to the starting level of GDP. If one more year of school is undertaken, the 
convergence coefficient is raised from 0.026 to 0.032.  
 
Much of the research has indicated conditional convergence takes place at a rate of around 
two percent a year, this result has been challenged by McQuinn and Whelan (2007). Contrary 
to Mankiw et al. (1992), McQuinn and Whelan (2007) believe the Solow growth model does 
not need to be augmented with human capital to accurately measure convergence. McQuinn 
and Whelan (2007) use a method which does not rely on country-specific fixed effects, 
overcoming many of the econometric problems of the past. The focus is on the speed at 
which capital-output ratios converge toward their steady state. McQuinn and Whelan (2007) 
estimate the convergence coefficient to be closer to seven percent instead of two percent as 
mentioned above. Although this figure is much higher than the 2 percent predicted by 
previous studies (Mankiw et al., 2007; Barro, 1997), McQuinn and Whelan (2007) believe 
the Solow growth model has erred in underpredicting the speed of convergence.  
 
According to the research cited above, there have been differing opinions about the speed of 
conditional convergence. Is it possible then, that countries with similar characteristics 
converge at a faster speed? Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) analysed 
data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Sala-i-Martin (1996) selected the OECD countries as a means of holding the steady state 
constant. Sala-i-Martin (1996) suggests that the OECD nations "could be considered similar 
ex-ante". Using this method, it was found that the estimated speed of convergence was 2 
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percent a year. Even though this figure was found to be statistically significant, Sala-i-Martin 
(1996, p. 1035) believed the estimate was very small. It would take a country 35 years to 
close half the distance between the initial level of income and the steady state. However, this 
does not mean countries are not able to develop rapidly. Countries in East Asia have been 
able to develop over the past 35 years to the point where their per capita GDP income has 
increased fourfold into the realm of modern economies (Nelson and Pack, 1999, p. 416).
9
 
This "miracle" is all the more astonishing because it is half the 80 years it took the OECD to 
reach that level of per capita GDP. These economies have outshone all their rivals in the 
1960's with comparable levels of income and productivity (Nelson and Pack, 1999, p. 416). 
 
The global financial crisis (GFC) has significantly changed the balance of growth in the 
world economy.  This rebalancing has meant the emerging economies have been picking up 
the slack from poor growth in the developed world (The Economist, 2010). Aggregate growth 
in emerging economies will outstrip that of the developed world by a factor of four, as a wave 
of foreign investment flows from America and Europe into Asia, Latin America and Africa 
(The Economist, 2010). As the UN (2010, p. 40) explains: 
This overall favourable external economic environment, combined with judicious policies, 
also allowed some developing countries to emerge as drivers of global growth, thereby, at 
least temporarily, reversing the previously observed divergence of economic performance.  
 
Figure 2.9 and Table 2.3 show the changing pattern in world economic growth as the 
emerging economies rebound from the GFC and the developed world stays flat. According to 
Wolf (2011) convergence which occurred in the wake of the GFC was not unprecedented, 
                                                          
9
 These nations include Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Japan achieved this feat in just 20 years, 
from 1952 to 1973 (Nelson and Pack, 1999, p. 416). 
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however, the scale was. For example, India's economy, at current rates of growth, would be 
about 80 percent of that of the US by 2030.  Nonetheless, its per capita GDP would still be 
less than a fifth of the US (Wolf, 2011). Wolf (2011) has named the divergence in growth 
amongst the emerging and developed economies the "great convergence". Crucially, he 
believed there was no reason for the convergence to stop, since "powerful market and 
technological forces are spreading the stock of knowledge across the globe" (Wolf, 2011, par. 
11).  
Figure 2.9: Growth of Output  
 
Source: Bernanke, 2010. 
 
Table 2.3: World Output Growth, 1991-2010 (Annual Percentage Change) 
Region/Country 1991-
2003 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
World 2.8 4.1 3.5 3.9 3.9 1.7 -1.9 3.5 
Developed 
Countries 
2.5 3.1 2.5 2.8 2.5 0.3 -3.4 2.2 
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USA 3.3 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.1 0.4 -2.4 2.9 
Japan 1.0 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.4 -1.2 -5.2 2.5 
EU-27 2.3 2.5 2.0 3.1 2.8 0.7 -4.2 1.1 
Developing 
Countries 
4.6 7.3 6.7 7.4 7.8 5.4 2.4 6.9 
Africa 3.0 5.9 5.6 5.9 6.0 4.9 2.5 4.8 
South Africa 2.4 4.9 5.0 5.3 5.5 3.7 -1.8 3.0 
South America 2.5 7.2 5.6 5.8 7.0 5.5 -0.2 5.9 
Brazil 2.5 5.7 3.2 4.0 6.1 5.1 -0.2 7.6 
Asia 5.9 8.0 7.6 8.2 8.8 5.8 4.0 7.8 
China 10.0 10.1 10.4 11.6 12.0 9.6 8.7 10.0 
India 5.8 8.3 9.3 9.4 9.6 5.1 6.6 7.9 
Source: United Nations, 2010, p. 2. 
 
The Case against Convergence 
Although we may be experiencing the "great convergence" post GFC, much of the 19
th 
and 
20
th
 centuries were defined by a divergence in world income (Wolf, 2011). As previously 
mentioned, proponents of convergence claim cross country income is converging at a speed 
of two to three percent a year. However, when studies have been carried out on a large 
sample, many empirical studies have reported a divergence in per capita GDP (Taylor, 2007). 
Baumol (1986), although finding conditional convergence amongst a group of similar 
industrialised nations, reported no evidence of convergence on a world wide scale. As 
mentioned above, he found evidence of three growth clubs.  
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The first club is represented in Table 2.2, with strong evidence of conditional convergence. 
As shown in Figure 2.10, this club (16 industrialised countries) is in the upper right hand 
corner of the graph. It is clear that countries with lower per capita GDP experienced higher 
growth. The second included the centrally planned economies with some evidence of 
convergence. In Figure 2.10, they lie slightly to the left of the industrialised countries, and as 
one can see, the relationship amongst this group is not as tight as the first. Finally, the poor 
and less developed countries, the last grouping in the bottom left hand corner of Figure 2.10. 
This club does display a relationship between their initial endowment and subsequent growth, 
however, it is not convergence, rather divergence.  
 
Figure 2.10: Growth Rates 1950-80, GDP per Capita vs. 1950 Level, 72 Countries 
 
Source: Summers and Heston cited Baumol, 1986, p. 1080. 
 
Baumol (1986) believed the observed convergence amongst industrialised countries to be the 
result of spillovers in innovation from the group leaders to the poor. Abramovitz (1986) both 
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supports and expands on this theory. Although Baumol's (1986) study showed that poor 
countries may benefit from being backward in terms of rapid economic growth, there is a 
caveat. According to Abramovitz (1986), one cannot say without qualification, that the 
capacity for a nation to grow is tied to its relative backwardness. Rather, development will be 
observed in countries with similar social capabilities. Even if one recognised the role social 
institutions play in economic growth, Abramovitz (1986) has expressed express concern that 
judgements about this may be highly problematic. Abramovitz (1986) also believed the 
catch-up hypothesis is simplistic. In addition, there may be negative effects from the leader to 
the growth country (US to Ireland in the early 1900s). Overall, a complete formulation of the 
convergence process, particularly where a cross section of countries are concerned, does not 
"lend itself to simple formulation" (Abramovitz, 1986, p. 406).  
 
Barro (1997) and Sala-I-Martin (1996) have also found no evidence of convergence on a 
worldwide basis, and as stated above the relationship is positive. According to Sala-i-Martin 
(1996), the dispersion of GDP per capita widens from 0.89 in 1960, to 1.12 in 1980. Similar 
results were found by Barro (1997). Lucas (1988) questioned the Solow growth model on this 
basis. He found, even in favourable periods, that GDP growth rates could differ. Furthermore, 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) found an absence of correlation between the initial level of 
per capita GDP and subsequent growth rates. The empirical results for convergence from 
1960 led Sala-i-Martin (1996, p. 1034) to claim that "there is no  -convergence and there is 
no  -convergence". As stated previously, when applied to a wide sample of countries 
convergence disappears. Theorists supporting the convergence hypothesis defend their 
position by applying the conditional convergence methodology. Therefore, developing 
countries may grow faster than the rich world, only if they satisfy certain conditions (Taylor, 
2007).  
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There has been criticism for the manner in which convergence clubs have been formed.  
Maddison (1995) believes Baumol's (1986) analysis was limited mainly to high income 
countries and biased in favour of the convergence hypothesis. Critics came from new growth 
theory, and using the Summers-Heston database showed convergence was limited to a select 
group of countries (Romer, 1994). Romer (1994), argued Baumol's (1986) findings were the 
result of ex post sample selection bias. Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) note that sample 
selection bias might have occurred because countries which had experienced exceptional 
growth were invited to join the OECD, thereby introducing bias toward convergence. 
However, they find of the new members, none is required to produce the convergence 
result.
10
 Studying countries on an ex ante basis, it was found that only economies with a 
starting per capita GDP of at least 25 percent of the US experienced convergence (Dowrick 
and Nguyen, 1989).
11
  
 
An additional benefit of running a regression on the ex ante sample is that it allows us to 
determine if there is convergence since 1870 (De Long, 1988). Table 2.4 shows a comparison 
in the standard deviation for Maddison's 16 industrialised countries and the once-rich 22.
12
 
Table 2.4 suggests the Maddison 16 are converging, while those countries which appeared 
rich in 1870 have experienced a divergence in incomes. In addition, De Long (1988) found 
measurement errors with the Maddison's data on real GDP per capita. These errors produced 
                                                          
10
 Only Japan has a significant impact on the convergence coefficient. Nonetheless, Japan is not required to 
reproduce the convergence result, in fact, its exclusion improves the statistical measures (Dowrick and 
Nguyen, 1988, p. 1020). 
11
 Only after explanatory variables are introduced, does the result favour convergence (Dowrick and Nguyen, 
1998, p. 1021). 
12
 De Long's (1988) once-rich 22 are a similar set of countries to Maddison's 16. Taking the second poorest of 
Maddison's 16, Finland, as the cut off for income removes Japan from the group and adds Argentina, Chile, 
East Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain. 
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results which favour convergence; a high income economy in 1870 may show lower growth 
over the period, even though there may be no relationship at all. Quah (1993) and Levine and 
Zervos (1993) also found that there may be statistical errors which can impede studies of 
convergence. Abramovitz's (1986) results show convergence before 1950 in Baumol's (1986) 
industrialised countries was weak and at best operated with moderate strength. This suggests 
that convergence only took place in a small timeframe before the world again experienced 
divergence in the mid-1970s.  
Table 2.4: Standard Deviations of Log of Output for Maddison's 16 and the Once-Rich 22 
Sample 1870 1913 1979 
Maddison's 16 0.411 0.355 0.145 
Once-Rich 22 0.315 0.324 0.329 
Source: De Long, 1988, p. 1146. 
 
Further evidence against convergence is given by Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Quah 
(1995; 1996). Using alternative econometric methods, little evidence of convergence was 
found. Durlauf and Johnson's (1995) analysis rejects the traditional cross-country linear 
model, in favour of one with a multiple steady state perspective. Quah (1993) found using 
more direct methods of determining convergence undermine the strength of the result. His 
results show that there is divergence in the long run towards "either the very rich or very 
poor" and that this gap appears to be widening (Quah, 1993, p. 17). Quah (1996) focuses on 
this income disparity across countries to construct the twin-peaks hypothesis. This 
hypothesis, shown in Figure 2.11, demonstrates the widening divergence of income groups 
into the very rich or very poor. All countries initially start at time  . Here, a majority of the 
countries are middle income, with some rich and some poor. At time    , at some point in 
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the future, the middle income countries are vanishing into rich and poor, leading to the twin 
peaks.  
Figure 2.11: Twin Peaks Distribution Dynamics 
 
Source: Quah, 1996, p. 1049. 
 
Quah (1996, p. 1053) also argued against the methodologies employed by proponents of 
conditional convergence. The traditional method for convergence analysis involves 
determining whether each economy is tending toward its own steady state. Quah (1996) 
believes it is preferable to examine what is happening to the entire sample of countries 
included in a study. He believes his results imply: 
 that the traditional approach cannot at all address the concerns of policy-makers 
interested in regional development, economic and geographical redistribution , and 
comparative economic performance Quah (1996, p. 1046). 
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There has been research to suggesting growth in GDP per capita slows once it reaches a 
certain threshold. Eichengreen and Shin (cited The Economist, 2011) examined countries 
whose GDP per capita grew on a purchasing-power-parity (PPP) basis of more than 3.5 
percent for more than seven years. Their results indicated that when a country's GDP per 
head reaches a threshold of US$16,740 at PPP, growth tends to slow down dramatically. 
Average growth drops from 5.6 percent to 2.1 percent. It is important to note that the authors 
believe there is no iron law for a slowdown once this threshold is achieved. Singapore, Hong 
Kong and many Western nations are examples of countries which have continued strong 
growth once they passed this point. Openness to trade, lifting domestic consumption and a 
currency which is not undervalued tend to increase the chance for growth to continue on its 
previous path (The Economist, 2011). As we can see from the convergence debate, many of 
the factors which may encourage growth beyond the threshold are not considered in the 
standard model. This is one of the reasons Solow (2000) does not find the literature in favour 
of convergence convincing.  
   
As the progenitor of the neoclassical growth model, Solow (2000, p. 103) has not found the 
literature on convergence to be interesting, "because the questions do not seem well posed". 
Furthermore, using technology for determining the rate of convergence may be problematic 
(Solow, 2000). The normal assumption is that technology is universal, however, this does not 
say anything about a countries ability to utilise this technology. In Solow's (2000, p. 103) 
words, "Abstract technology by itself butters no parsnips". To say that two countries have the 
same technology: 
is very much a matter of worker's skills and attitudes toward work, managerial and 
administrative habits, interpersonal attitudes, social norms and institutions, and no doubt 
44 
 
many other hard and soft characteristics of the economic and social environment (Solow, 
2000, p. 103). 
If these two countries fail to converge, we are left with a choice of blaming the theory or that 
these countries differ in any number of intangible respects and therefore do not really share 
the same technology (Solow, 2000). As mentioned above, a good example of this is the 
comparison between the OECD and poor countries. That they show no tendency to converge 
is not a surprise since they may "have institutional infrastructures that make them for now, 
fundamentally different from rich countries" (Solow, 2000, p. 104). 
 
Total Factor Productivity and Economic Growth 
The failure of convergence across a wide sample of countries has led to a change in focus 
toward total factor productivity (Taylor, 2007, p. 27). According to Nishimizu and Robinson 
(1984, p. 177), TFP measures the "economic and technical efficiency with which resources 
are converted into products".   is taken as a proxy for technological progress in the form of 
TFP (Taylor, 2007). The literature on TFP has primarily focused on the rapid development of 
East Asia (Nelson and Pack, 1999).  There are two alternative views on the value of using 
TFP as a measure of long term growth. The first theory believes that rapid accumulation of 
physical and human capital were responsible for the rapid growth. The second theory believes 
the assimilation of modern technology and change in industrial structure has been responsible 
for the Asian miracle (Nelson and Pack, 1999). A summary of each theory is given in Table 
2.5. 
Table 2.5: Accumulation and Assimilation of Factor Inputs  
Accumulation Theories Assimilation Theories 
Measurement: Total Factor Productivity Measurement: Rate of Total Factor Productivity 
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Rapid economic development is caused by high 
investment rates, whereby the bulk of the share of 
increased output per worker is explained by 
increases in physical and human capital per worker. 
Rapid Economic development is linked to 
entrepreneurship, innovation and learning. New 
Technologies from advanced nations also have to be 
adopted. Although investments in human and physical 
capital are pre-requisites, they are not sufficient. 
Little attention is paid to firms as their behaviour is 
basically determined by the external environment. 
Entrepreneurial firms and their ability to learn rapidly 
are critical factors behind the success of South Korea, 
Singapore and China. 
Accumulation of human capital is treated as an 
increase in the effectiveness of labour.  
Sharply rising educational attainment means that well-
educated managers, engineers and workers have a 
comparative advantage in terms of new opportunities 
and effective learning of new techniques. 
Accumulation of human capital is an important factor 
behind entrepreneurship. 
Economies in which the stocks of rising human 
capital are rising rapidly are expected to show a 
steep rise in manufacturing exports. There should 
also be a shift in comparative advantage towards the 
sectors that employ these inputs intensively. 
Therefore, there is nothing commendable about a 
surge in manufacturing exports.  
In order to compete effectively in world markets, firms 
require not only government support but must also 
acquire factors such as the necessary learning, 
entrepreneurship and innovation. Exports stimulate 
learning in two ways: (1) being forced to compete in 
world markets will make managers and engineers of 
firms pay close attention to best practice; and (2) the 
increase in exports is usually with US and Japanese 
firms which give assistance in order to achieve high 
standards. 
Source: Nelson and Pack cited Taylor, 2007, p. 29. 
 
Accumulation Theories and the East Asian Tigers 
Interest in TFP arose to explain the Asian Miracle (Nelson and Pack, 1999). Numerous 
studies covering countries in the region were conducted (Nishimizu and Hulten, 1978; 
Christensen and Cummings, 1981; Jorgensen and Nishimizu, 1981; Yuan, 1983; Nishimizu 
and Robinson, 1981; Kim and Lau, 1994; Krugman, 1994). Yuan (1983; 1985) examined the 
growth of manufacturing in Singapore through the 1970s. No evidence of productivity 
growth was found in the manufacturing sector, meaning the growth Singapore had 
experienced was input driven. Similar findings were reported for Japan by Nishimizu and 
Hulten (1983). These results contradict 'Verdoorn's law', the positive relationship between 
output and productivity (Nishimizu and Robinson, 1984).  
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Yuan (1985) examines three hypotheses which may explain the lack of TFP growth. The first 
hypothesis deals with the volume of foreign investment in Singapore. By 1979, foreign firms 
employed 57 percent of the manufacturing workforce and produced 74 percent of 
manufacturing output. This may lead to lower TFP growth, because of the possibility that 
foreign firms are operating at the best practice frontier due to constraints faced by 
transnational companies. The second hypothesis involves the 'low-wage' policy and the 
availability of low skilled workers in Singapore.  
 
Three factors contribute to this hypothesis. Wages were found to decrease slightly over the 
decade, female participation increased to 39 percent over the period (from 25 percent), and 
increased immigration from Malaysia. These factors may have reduced the incentive to 
improve labour productivity. The third hypothesis states low productivity may have been the 
result of low technical capability and a scarcity of domestic industrial entrepreneurship. This 
is in contrast to South Korea which was strong in both technical capability and 
entrepreneurship (Westphal, Rhee, Kim and Amsden, 1984). Whatever the reason, 17 out of 
the 28 manufacturing industries in Singapore regressed in terms of productivity growth 
(Yuan, 1985, p. 28). This led Yuan (1985, p. 34) to conclude that, in a country with a "land-
and-labour-scarce economy, this pattern cannot continue without detrimental effects on 
output growth". 
 
Kim and Lau (1994; 1996) expanded their focus across the East Asian and Asia Pacific 
region. Like Yuan's (1985) findings for Singapore, Kim and Lau (1994; 1996) and Young 
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(1994) found little evidence of TFP growth in the region. Capital accumulation was found to 
be the most important source of growth in the Asia Pacific region, accounting for between 55 
(Hong Kong) and 116 (Indonesia) percent of real output growth. This is in contrast to the 
industrialised West, where technical progress is the primary (between 41 and 64 percent) 
driver of growth (Kim and Lau, 1996). Labour was found to be the second most important 
source of growth in the Asia Pacific region, whereas for the developed countries it was 
capital. Kim and Lau (1996) argued that in the absence of TFP growth, the current path of the 
Asia Pacific countries was not sustainable; eventually these economies will experience 
diminishing marginal productivity. To overcome this decline, Kim and Lau (1996) 
recommend devoting a greater proportion of resources to activities which enhance 
productivity (i.e. research and development).  
 
Krugman (1994) and Easterly and Fischer (1994) applied the experience of the Soviet Union 
to the Asian growth miracle. Easterly and Fischer (1994) found that over the lifetime of the 
Soviet Union, a high investment ratio is not sufficient to maintain extensive growth. This 
position is supported by Krugman (1994) who argued the communist model offered no free 
lunch. This was because the Soviet Union relied solely on sacrificing present consumption (in 
the form of savings) for the possibility of increased production in the future. The problem 
Krugman (1994) argued, was that the Soviet Union's strength was its ability to mobilise 
resources, not use them efficiently. Easterly and Fischer (1994) suggest that even though the 
East Asian nations are investing in a broad range of capital goods, diminishing returns would 
still emerge as a problem for these countries.
13
 Krugman (1994) believes there are similarities 
between the Soviet Union and East Asia, claiming the mass mobilisation of resources in East 
                                                          
13
 The Soviet Union on the other hand, only invested in a narrow range of capital goods (Easterly and Fischer, 
1994, p. 24).  
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Asia "would have done Stalin proud". Furthermore, East Asia cannot rely on this model in 
the long term. Growth in Singapore: 
has been based largely on one-time change in behaviour that cannot be repeated. Over the 
past generation the percentage of people employed has almost doubled; it cannot double 
again. A half-educated workforce has been replaced by one in which the bulk of workers has 
high school diplomas: it is unlikely that a generation from now most Singaporeans will have 
Ph.D.s. And an investment share of 40 percent is amazingly high by any standard; a share of 
70 percent would be ridiculous (Krugman, 1994, p. 71). 
Adding these factors up, accumulationists believe countries in East Asia cannot continue to 
grow as it once did. 
 
Assimilation Theories of Growth 
The Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990's seemed to support the accumulationist argument 
about input led growth (Liang and Mei, 2005). However, Liang and Mei (2005) believe 
strong growth recorded by these countries after the crisis contradicted the claims of the 
Krugman-Kim-Lau-Young hypothesis. Furthermore, if we examine the TFP figure for 
Singapore from Young (1994), there appears to be little correlation between the growth of a 
country and its productivity. As Taylor (2007) explains, if TFP were an accurate measure of 
long term growth we would expect to see the countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt and 
Pakistan outgrow Singapore as well as many East Asian nations. This has not been the case 
as the former countries are still technologically backward and have not grown faster on 
average than the East Asian nations over the past two decades. Taylor (2007) also states that 
none of the countries in the top five according to TFP exhibited speeds of convergence 
stronger than Singapore.  
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Sarel (1997) found values for TFP could differ substantially, based on the methods used for 
its calculation. Sarel's (1997) results suggest Singapore had a TFP growth of 2.2 percent. This 
is in contrast with Young's (1994) estimate for Singapore's TFP at 0.1 percent. Table 2.6 
shows the differences in TFP growth between the studies done by Young (1994) and Sarel 
(1997). The differences in result may stem mainly from the much lower estimate of capital 
share (0.493 for Young) in the study compared with 0.377. According to Sarel's (1997) 
calculations, Young's (1994) estimate for TFP growth for Singapore would jump to 1.8 
percent if a capital share of 0.377 were used. Additionally, disparities in TFP may be the 
result of a different estimation period, the methods of measurement used to determine capital 
stocks and labour supply, and the use of domestic and international prices (Sarel, 1997). This 
view is supported by Collins and Bosworth (1996).  
Table 2.6: Comparison of Young's and Sarel's TFP Growth Estimates 
 Young's TFP Sarel's TFP 
Malaysia 1.0 2.00 
Singapore 0.1 2.20 
Thailand 1.9 2.25 
Source: Young, 1994, p. 970; Sarel, 1997, p. 29. 
  
There is, however, agreement between the competing schools about the causal factors of the 
Asian miracle. All of the Asian nations have achieved rapid economic growth, driven by high 
investment in physical capital stock and human capital (Nelson and Pack, 1997). There is less 
agreement over what this factor driven growth might mean in the future. Assimilation 
theories of growth believe that as the economy expands, technologies and practices become 
more efficient; resources are used more efficiently per unit of input (Taylor, 2007). 
Increasing capital investment supports productivity growth because new technology is 
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fostered with the introduction of new machines (Taylor, 2007). This view of technology was 
first proposed by Kaldor (cited Taylor, 2007), who stated that it is impossible to distinguish 
between TFP growth from capital accumulation and technical knowledge. This view is 
supported by Robinson (1970) in critiquing Jorgenson's study of the US. 
 
Replacement of the capital stock may also increase productivity. According to Singh (cited 
Taylor, 2007), replacement technology is more advanced than previous vintages of capital. 
Since each new vintage of capital brings with it a new wave of technology, it is unlikely that 
diminishing returns to capital will set in. Higher rates of investment mean higher turnover of 
capital and therefore more technological progress, the opposite of what the accumulationists 
claimed would happen. In addition to being beneficial for growth, Khan and Kumar's (1997) 
results show the source of investment also matters. Private investment was found to have 
higher rates of return than public investment, with this difference increasing over time. In 
poor countries, however, public investment may have higher rates of return. Khan and Kumar 
(1997) suggest policymakers need to improve productivity in the public sector, by identifying 
investments with highest rate of return, and encouraging private investment through a stable 
microeconomic environment. 
 
Not only does a higher investment bring higher technological progress, but it also appears 
there is a social dividend with investment in capital. De Long and Summers (1991) believe 
the social return on equipment investment to be around 30 percent, higher than other forms of 
investment. Their results also indicate that the private return to equipment investment is 
lower than the social return. Further, they believe their social return estimate has understated 
the real return. Even though, as stated by Singh (cited Taylor, 2007) and De Long and 
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Summers (1991), capital investment is important, just as crucial is the manner in which 
resources are employed. Examining the poor performing countries, De Long and Summers 
(1991, p. 486) believe they have "confused support for industrialisation with support for 
industrialists". Encouraging equipment investment through purchases appears to be more 
successful than supporting industrialists, particularly when comparing East Asia to Latin 
America (De Long and Summers, 1991). 
 
The Neoclassical Model in Context 
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the neoclassical model did not form in a 
vacuum. Rather, it was developed in response to the knife-edged balance of the Harrod-
Domar model of economic growth. The manner in which the neoclassical model differs from 
Harrod-Domar in Chapter 2 has already been examined so the purpose in this section is to 
give the standard model some context with regard to endogenous models of growth. It is 
important to note that the limitations of the Solow (1956) growth analysis brought about the 
development of endogenous theories of growth. This section provides a brief overview of this 
new growth paradigm so that the analysis of economic growth will be more complete. 
 
The Development of Endogenous Theories of Growth 
Before we examine the key differences between the neoclassical and endogenous growth 
models, it is worth considering some of the empirical facts about growth. Romer (1994) has 
distilled into five facts, the evidence about growth which economists take for granted. These 
are (Romer, 1994, p. 12): 
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1) There are many firms in a market economy. 
2) Discoveries differ from other inputs in the sense that many people can use them at the 
same time.  
3) It is possible to replicate physical activities. 
4) Technological advance comes from things that people do.  
5) Many individuals and firms have market power and earn monopoly rents on 
discoveries. 
According to Romer (1994), the neoclassical model satisfies the first three of these facts. 
Now that some of the primary empirical facts have been examined, we can discuss how 
endogenous growth models evolved from the neoclassical framework.   
 
There are a number of reasons why growth theorists may want to build on or change the 
neoclassical model. As shown above, one reason may be that the model does not fully 
encompass the available data. An extension of this argument leads us to the dispute about 
convergence and divergence (Solow, 2000). In the debates on convergence, the applicability 
of TFP and capital controversy, show that the neoclassical growth model does have some 
flaws which are not reconcilable with empirical research. This is particularly the case with 
studies on convergence and divergence, as Solow (2000, p. 12) states:  
One conclusion from all these cross-section studies is that most results are not very robust. 
The outcome seems to vary with minor changes in assumptions, minor changes in the use of 
data, and minor changes in the sample time period.
14
 
 
                                                          
14
 Romer (1994) gives a detailed review of the convergence debate in The Origins of Endogenous Growth. 
53 
 
A second reason why a change may be necessary relates to the growth path of technology. As 
we have seen in Chapter 2, only changes in the level of technological progress have growth 
effects. It is all very well to say that all an economy requires for sustainable growth is 
technological progress, but that in itself does not tell us where this progress comes from. 
Indeed, a common caricature of the Solow growth model is that technology falls like "manna 
from heaven" (The Economist, 2006, par. 9). The next step is to move beyond technology as 
an exogenous variable and try to endogenise the process. This is what group of models 
known as the endogenous growth models have attempted to achieve (Kaldor, 1957; Kaldor, 
1961; Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962; Romer, 1986; 1990; Lucas, 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 
1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Scott, 1993; Taylor, 2007).
15
  
 
At first, the primary concern of the new growth models was not the economics of technical 
progress (Solow, 1994). Rather, it was on the abandonment of diminishing returns to capital. 
Solow (2000, p. 123) has described this process as "little more than going back to Domar". 
Much of the early work in reviving endogenous growth models includes: 
substitutability between capital and labour and between various forms of capital, 
allowance for only asymptotic absence of diminishing returns to capital, the adoption of a 
representative-agent set-up with infinite-horizon intertemporal optimisation to determine 
investment (in everything), and the introduction of monopolistic competition as the 
underlying market form (Solow, 1994, p. 49). 
The AK models formulated by Romer (1986) are an example of the type of model described 
above. In these models, the production function is     , where   is constant (Romer, 
1986; Lucas, 1988).  Human capital is used to augment physical capital so that diminishing 
returns do not set in (Taylor, 2007). According to Romer (1994), both his (1986) and Lucas's 
                                                          
15
 You (1994, p. 213) shows that it was in fact Kaldor (1957) who introduced a model of endogenous technical 
progress, which was aimed at criticising the neoclassical production function and the marginal productivity 
theory of distribution.  
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(1988) models took account of facts 1-4 without taking the final step and including fact 5. 
Much of the work since the inception of these models has focused on explaining the 
evolution of technological progress.  
 
Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991)
16
 and Aghion and Howitt (1992) have moved 
beyond the notion of constant returns to scale for capital to give explanations of the sources 
of technological progress. In Romer's (1990) model, growth is driven by the stock of human 
capital. Human capital is given by        , where    is the final output sector and    
is the research sector (Romer, 1990). An economy which has an emphasis on the production 
of new capital goods (  ) will experience higher growth than those which rely heavily on the 
final output sector. This is because a new design increases the total stock of knowledge in an 
economy, even if the inventor has patent rights over the design. Other researchers are free to 
study the patent designs of the "widget" which helps them in the design of the "wodget" 
(Romer, 1990, p. 84).  
 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) utilise a slightly different approach to Romer (1990). In the 
Grossman-Helpman model, growth effects are the result of two mechanisms; the production 
of an expanding variety of consumer goods which is reinforced by the accumulation of 
human knowledge (Solow, 2000). Since technology has positive externalities (spillover 
effects), investment in innovation and increased trade between countries encourage the 
production of a greater variety of products and increase the quality of goods presently 
available. If these conditions are met the growth rate will increase (Taylor, 2007). In the 
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 Both the Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) models are based on Arrow's (1962) learning-by-
doing-framework. 
55 
 
Grossman-Helpman model, trade places an important role in the determination of growth 
rates. This is because trade not only expands the variety of products available, but also 
encourages the exchange of ideas.  
 
The two models mentioned above are in a "vague and general way" associated with some of 
the ideas postulated by Schumpeter (Solow, 2000).  Aghion and Howitt (1992) took growth 
theory a step further by introducing some "archetypal" Schumpeterian ideas into endogenous 
growth models (Solow, 2000). As with the models above, new technology is the driver of the 
growth process. To achieve this, "creative destruction" provides an incentive for those in the 
market to keep innovating. This is due to the fact that new innovations may render previous 
iterations of technology unprofitable. The driver of innovation then, is the temporary 
monopolistic rents innovators receive from new forms of technology. As new forms of 
technology are discovered,   increases, producing growth effects. The three models 
mentioned above are able to encapsulate all of the five facts outlined by Romer (1994). One 
may expect that, because these theories are able to model the five facts that they are superior 
to the neoclassical model, this is not the case, according to Solow. 
  
Solow's Response 
As an old growth theorist, Solow (1994; 2000) is quick to acknowledge the contribution to 
growth theory which the endogenous models make. However, he is cautious about some of 
the claims and assumptions made in endogenous growth theory. With reference to the first 
group of models, where the focus was on constant returns to scale for capital, Solow (1994) 
believes this assumption to be untenable. As these models resemble much of the Domar 
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framework, they have also inherited the assumption of knife-edged balance, where a touch of 
increasing or decreasing returns to scale can alter the models' outcomes drastically. With 
regard to the latter models, Solow (2000) believes they assume too much about the nature of 
technological progress.  As Solow (2000, p. 172) states:  
… the whole literature-may be too ambitious. There is probably a substantial, essentially 
exogenous element in the amount and direction of technology change. Fields of research 
become hot or go dry unexpectedly; in industrial research it is not unusual for results to 
arise that were not intended when the research was planned and paid for. 
This discussion has highlighted some of the key differences about growth models. It is clear 
that although the neoclassical model only captures 3 of the facts about growth, it does have 
advantages over the endogenous growth models by capturing all growth effects. On the other 
hand, new growth models move the literature forward by endogenising technological 
progress and not treating it as simply "manna from heaven". 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has traced the growing body of literature on the neoclassical growth model over 
the past five decades. We began with an exposition of neoclassical growth theory. The most 
important facet of the model is the determination of the steady state, specifically, how far a 
country is from its steady state. From this we can ascertain if an economy's growth path is 
sustainable. Though an economy may increase its growth rate by raising the level of savings, 
it is only a temporary solution. To obtain sustainable growth, an economy must increase its 
technical progress.   
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The nature of the steady state and the limitation of using a model to reflect reality were 
discussed as part of recognising the limitations of the model. Following that theme, the 
Cambridge Controversies of the early 1960s and late 1970s, were an attempt to show that one 
could not accurately measure the stock of capital. Though the debate has settled down, with 
both sides believing they had struck the final blow, the debate has remained unresolved. 
Following the capital controversy, the debate on convergence was reviewed. Little evidence 
was found to suggest absolute convergence, although many believed there was evidence to 
support conditional convergence. A counter to conditional convergence was mounted because 
there was little evidence countries were converging, in fact there was divergence.  
 
Further debate involved the role of the TFP in predicting the long term growth prospects of 
an economy. On the one hand, it was believed that the East Asian countries would follow the 
path of the Soviet Union, due to their massive capital mobilisation. On the other, it was 
argued that TFP cannot be relied on since new capital embodies technological progress. The 
final section of this chapter focused on the development of new growth theory. Though the 
ideas behind much of the work are hardly new, they do move growth theory forward by 
endogenising the growth process. The next chapter will give a history of the Australian 
economy with a focus on the components of the neoclassical growth model; GDP, capital and 
labour.    
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Chapter 3: The Australian Economy 
Introduction 
Australia has been called the "lucky country", particularly in the wake of the global financial 
crisis (Citibank, 2009). Certainly, Australia's economic performance has compared 
favourably with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
growth prospects for the future are promising (OECD, 2011). This was not always the case; 
however, Australian growth in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was on average lower than the 
OECD (The Treasury, 2001). As covered in Chapter 2, the factors determining TFP are GDP, 
capital and labour.
17
 The purpose of this chapter is to give a history of each of the 
components of the neoclassical model from 1960 to 2010. Before a history of the components 
of the neoclassical model can be given, it is important to give a brief background of the 
overall economy since federation.  
 
The Australian Economy, 1901 to 1959 
The Commonwealth of Australia was formed in 1901 with a bicameral system of government 
(DFAT, 2008). At the time of Federation, the non-indigenous population in Australia was 
around 3.9 million people, with around half living in the cities. Economic growth in the five 
decades leading up to the 1950s was volatile with strong fluctuations. According to The 
Treasury (2001), the variability in output growth is the result of volatility in agricultural 
production, as well as, the two world wars and the Great Depression. After the resolution of 
World War Two, economic growth has been generally stable without reaching the peaks of 
the preceding 50 years (The Treasury, 2001). The structure of the Australian economy also 
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 Both GDP and capital have been adjusted for inflation.  
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changed rapidly during this time. Agriculture grew as a percentage share of GDP following 
Federation, reaching an apex of almost 30 per cent, but began to steadily decline at the onset 
World War One. Mining followed a similar pattern to agriculture; however, the sector did not 
increase before World War One and instead declined to below five per cent of GDP. 
Manufacturing on the other hand, increased from around 10 per cent of GDP to its peak of 
almost 30 per cent after World War Two and leading into the 1950s. The services sector had 
a relatively constant share of GDP between 50 and 60 per cent for the first six decades after 
Federation.  
 
Just like economic growth, unemployment experienced high volatility during the period 
leading up to the 1950s. Unemployment was on average higher in the period leading up to 
World War Two than after. This trend was exacerbated by the onset of the Great Depression, 
where unemployment more than doubled in the year leading to 1930, when the jobless rate 
was around 21 per cent. The beginning of World War Two saw a dramatic turnaround; 
unemployment decreased to below five per cent and was maintained at that level until the 
1970s. It is worth noting that inflation during the first six decades was relatively low for the 
most part (The Treasury, 2001). The only decade which experienced a high level of inflation 
was the second decade, during World War One (The Treasury, 2001). Now that a brief 
history of the Australian economy leading up to the 1960s has been given, we can focus on a 
more detailed examination of the proceeding five decades. 
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The Australian Economy, 1960 to 2010 
The following section will focus in detail on the Australian economy, specifically real GDP 
growth, capital formation and the labour market 1960. As we will see, the Australian 
economy has been flexible and resilient over five decades, overcoming many of the 
challenges brought on by economic and political developments, domestically and 
internationally.  
 
Gross Domestic Product Growth 
In spite of the global financial crisis, Australia's GDP growth continued to remain strong in 
comparison to other OECD countries. The Australian economy's strength during the GFC . 
As shown in Figure 3.1, GDP growth in the past five decades has been volatile, particularly 
in the two decades proceeding 1970. 
Figure 3.1: Australian Economic Growth, 1960-2010 
 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 5204.0 
-3 
-1 
1 
3 
5 
7 
9 
1
9
6
0
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
2
 
1
9
7
4
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
8
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
1
0
 
P
er
ce
n
t 
61 
 
 Although growth has been volatile, Figure 3.2 shows the economy growing in a relatively 
linear fashion since the 1960s. This section will give a history of Australian economic growth 
since 1960. Much of the discussion focuses on the role of macroeconomic policy (specifically 
fiscal and monetary policy), inflation and in later periods, the potential impact of a current 
account deficit. Anderson and Gruen (1995) wrote that a macroeconomic framework which is 
conducive to growth is characterised by five features. They are; (1) a low and predictable 
inflation rate, (2) an appropriate real interest rate, (3) stable and sustainable fiscal policy, (4) 
a competitive and predictable real exchange rate and (5) a balance of payments regarded as 
viable. As we can see from the five factors above, fiscal and monetary policy play an 
important role in the performance of an economy. This was not the case leading into the 
1960s, as fiscal policy was thought to be the primary lever, through which government could 
influence economic growth.  
Figure 3.2: Australian Real GDP, 1960-2010
 
 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 5204.0 
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The 1960s were considered to be a prosperous time in Australia. Average growth during the 
decade was 5.3 percent, markedly higher than any other period since Federation (The 
Treasury, 2001). As seen in Figure 3.1, although growth was volatile during this period, it did 
not fall below zero and was overall strong. This period has been referred to as the "golden 
age" by Harcourt (2006, p. 153), with strong growth and low unemployment. According to 
Sinclair (1976), strong growth during the 1960s was primarily due to the transition toward 
manufacturing production and rapid population growth. As noted above, fiscal policy was the 
dominant tool with which government influenced economic growth. This policy alignment 
was due to the dominance of the Phillips curve at the time.  
Table 3.1: Decade Average GDP Growth, Australia, 1960-2010 
Decade 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Average Growth 5.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.1 
Source: The Treasury, 2001, p. 55; ABS, cat. no. 5204.0 
 
The Phillips curve provided a menu from which policy makers could decide on a desirable 
trade-off between the growth of output and inflation (Grenville, 2001).
18
 The focus for 
macroeconomic policy was to smooth out short term fluctuations in the business cycle 
(Grenville, 2001). It is in this capacity that monetary policy (through the Reserve Bank of 
Australia) was seen as inferior to fiscal policy, due to the fact that it had long time lags with 
regard to investment (Phillips, 1962). Figures 3.1 and 3.3 show Australian policy makers 
were successful in exploiting the Phillips curve, as growth was high and inflation relatively 
                                                          
18
According to the Phillips curve, higher inflation related to a lower unemployment rate and vice versa (Phillips, 
1962). 
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low.
19
 The success of policy makers during this period gave way to increasing confidence 
that the relationship between unemployment and inflation could be further exploited to 
extract more growth (McFarlane, 1997). Near the end of the decade, the Phillips curve began 
to fracture. As the negative correlation between unemployment and inflation began to break 
down, the Australian economy faced the onset of a new macroeconomic problem known as 
stagflation. 
Figure 3.3: Percentage Change in CPI and GDP Deflator, Australia, 1960-2010 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 6401.0; ABS, cat. no. 5206.0. 
Table 3.2: Average Growth of the CPI and GDP Deflator over Five Year Cycles, Australia, 
1961-65 to 2006-10 
Five Year Cycle Consumer Price Index GDP Deflator 
1961-1965 1.9 2.3 
1966-1970 3.1 3.9 
                                                          
19
Inflation here is referring to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI measures the quarterly change in the 
prices of a basket of goods, where the basked covers a wide range of goods and services (ABS, 2011). The GDP 
deflator covers the changes in price of all goods and services within an economy, excluding imports (Lewis et 
al. 2006). 
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1971-1975 9.5 10.7 
1976-1980 11.0 10.4 
1981-1985 8.5 8.9 
1986-1990 8.1 7.1 
1990-1995 2.6 1.7 
1996-2000 1.8 1.4 
2001-2005 3.4 3.5 
2006-2010 3.0 3.8 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 6401.0; ABS, cat. no. 5206.0. 
 
The early 1970s saw a sharp increase in the inflation rate. Table 3.1 shows an increase in the 
average CPI and GDP deflator from around three percent to 10 percent from 1971 to 1975. 
Additionally, growth was affected as well. Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 show growth declining 
from the highs of the 1960s to an average of 3.4 percent for the decade (The Treasury, 2001).  
Cagliarini et al. (2010) identify six reasons for the breakdown of the Phillips curve and the 
rapid increase in inflation: 
1) An under appreciation of the build-up of supply side factors 
2) Phillips curve expectations rose, providing no durable menu choice 
3) Strengthening bargaining position of labour in a full employment world 
4) Ossification of product markets under heavy regulation 
5) Public ownership and protection 
6) Stronger and more organised oil producers (OPEC) 
In addition to the pressures mentioned above, fiscal policy was unable to deal with the 
stagflation of the 1970s. With a decline in growth and rise in inflation, the Phillips curve 
broke down paving the way for monetarism to provide an alternative. 
65 
 
 
Monetarism presented new ideas highlighting the role of the RBA in macroeconomic policy. 
According to McFarlane (1997), Australia's stagflation in the 1970s was primarily due to real 
wage pressures. With a focus on rational expectations, monetarists believed the only way to 
control rapid inflation was with a credible monetary policy (Friedman, 1977). Fiscal policy 
was no longer seen as the primary driver with which to maintain price stability, increasing the 
significance of the RBA. Part of the solution in achieving a credible policy was to target the 
money supply, since inflation is "always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" 
(Friedman and Friedman, 1980, p. 280). In Australia, forecasts for M3 were announced each 
budget beginning in 1976 (McFarlane, 1997). As shown in Figure 3.3, the inflation rate began 
a steady decline after this point.  
 
Although the concept of monetary targets may seem simple enough, they were no panacea for 
central bankers. What monetarists argued for was a strict adherence to monetary targeting 
rules, however, the RBA was more pragmatic in its approach. During the late 1970s and early 
1980s, only a third of the years were within the target range of the official monetary target 
(McFarlane, 1997). Part of the difficulty for central bankers was that the previously stable 
demand for money equation began to derail like the Phillips curve before it. This was the 
result of technological progress, deregulation and structural change within the financial sector 
(Dornbusch et al., 2006). By the end of the decade, Australia's macroeconomy showed signs 
of recovering from the worst of the stagflation, inflation was coming down and output growth 
was close to trend.
20
 
 
                                                          
20
 By 1980, GDP growth was around 3 percent compared to a century average of 3.5 percent (Treasury, 2001). 
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The 1980s were a period of structural change for the Australian economy. Major 
microeconomic and macroeconomic reforms were enacted, designed to ease supply side 
pressures.
21
 These reforms included substantial tariff reductions, floating of the currency, a 
greater focus on flexible, productivity based wages and international competitiveness (de 
Brouwer and Ericsson, 1998). Australia's growth declined significantly early in the decade. 
The decline in growth was part of a worldwide recession, which was exacerbated by a serious 
drought, dropping agricultural output by a quarter, as well as real wage increases, due to a 
campaign by unions (Gruen and Sayegh, 2005). Evidence of the recession is visible in Figure 
3.1, with growth declining more than at any other period over the five decades being studied. 
After the recession, growth continued at a relatively strong pace for the remainder of the 
decade as shown in Table 3.1, with average growth of 3.4 percent.  
Figure 3.4: Australia's Current Account Balance, Australia, 1959-60 to 2009-10 
 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 5302.0 
                                                          
21
 These reforms are covered in detail in Chapter 4.  
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Although growth returned after the worldwide recession, there was a build up of pressure 
elsewhere in the economy, specifically the current account deficit (CAD). From early in the 
1960s to 1984, the CAD had averaged 2.75 percent. Figure 3.4 shows the widening of the 
CAD after 1984-1985. The reason for the concern amongst policy makers and the community 
was that the widening CAD was seen as part of the reason for a rapid rise in Australia's 
foreign debt (Gruen and Sayegh, 2005).
22
 As well as the large CAD, commercial property 
was experiencing a bubble (Bell and Quiggin, 2008). The imperative for policy makers was 
to tighten conditions to combat the widening CAD and boom in property prices (Gruen and 
Stevens, 2000).  
 
As fiscal and monetary policy tightened, economic growth declined significantly to produce a 
recession in the early 1990s. At the time, policy makers were confident higher interest rates 
would be able to produce a soft landing after previous experiences in the early 1980s. The 
fact that interest rates were lower in 1989 than after previous tightening in 1985 reaffirmed 
those assumptions (Bell and Quiggin, 2008).  The result of this tightening can be seen in 
Figure 3.1, with growth declining below zero for the second time in a decade. Adding to 
pressure on policy makers, ratings agencies Standard and Poor's and Moody's had given 
worsening assessments of Australia's debt, leading to credit downgrades (Gruen and Sayegh, 
2005). Australia was also one of the only countries to experience a recession in the world at 
that time (Lewis, Garnett, Hawtrey and Treadgold, 2006). However, the consensus which had 
formed amongst policy makers was not to go unchallenged.  
                                                          
22
 Other reasons for the rise in foreign debt were that there was relatively little currency hedging at the time 
coupled with a depreciation in the currency (Gruen and Sayegh, 2005, p. 621).  
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An alternative view was provided by Pitchford (1989, 1990, and 1992), Makin (1988) and 
Corden (1992). This group believed that a large current account deficit was neither good nor 
bad. Rather the CAD is representative of investment decisions made by "consenting adults". 
At the time, this challenge to the consensus was treated as "academic, in the pejorative sense 
of the word" (Gruen and Stevens, 2000, p. 58). Over time, the consenting adults view of the 
CAD became more influential, as there had been no evidence to suggest a large CAD has a 
negative impact for growth (Gruen and Sayegh, 2005). This does not include the recession of 
the early 1990s, where tightening of fiscal and monetary policy in response to the CAD have 
been identified as the cause of the downturn (Gruen and Stevens, 2000; Gruen and Sayegh, 
2005; Lewis et al., 2006; Bell and Quiggin, 2008). The experience of the recessions in the 
early 1980s and 1990s formed the basis of a formalisation for macroeconomic policy in 
Australia.  
 
In 1998, the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 formalised a framework for the operation of 
fiscal policy in Australia. The goal of the act was to improve fiscal policy outcomes by 
"requiring fiscal strategy to be based on principles of sound fiscal management and by 
facilitating public scrutiny of fiscal policy and performance" (Treasury, 1998, par. 1). The 
origins of the charter can be traced back to the FitzGerald Report on national saving (Gruen 
and Sayegh, 2005). Saving had fallen to its lowest point in the post war period. Part of the 
reason for concern about the level of national saving was the impact it may have on growth. 
Reviewing the evidence, FitzGerald (1996, p. 10) felt that raising the level of national saving 
"will also lift national investment (and as well reduce the external deficit), leading to higher 
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growth on a sustainable basis".
23
 According to FitzGerald (1993; 1996), the primary cause of 
the low savings rate was government, with a secular decline in saving over the previous two 
decades. In light of the decline in savings and the CAD, the fiscal strategy was to achieve 
balance over the course of the economic cycle. Overall, the aim of the charter was to place 
fiscal policy on a "similar footing" to monetary policy in terms of credibility and 
sustainability (Gruen and Sayegh, 2005, p. 631).   
 
As mentioned above, Anderson and Gruen (1995) have suggested that a macroeconomic 
framework which is conducive to growth includes a low and predictable inflation rate and an 
appropriate real interest rate. In 1993 an inflation target was formally introduced with a 
commitment to 2-3 percent inflation over the long run (McFarlane, 1997). There was some 
criticism of the target itself and the flexibility with which it was to be applied. However, the 
RBA believed that the best growth performance in the post-war period was when inflation 
was in the 2.something range (Stevens, 2003). According to Lim (2008), inflation and wage 
expectations remained grounded since the inception of inflation targeting. An important 
institutional change also happened during this period with the release of the Statement on the 
Conduct of Monetary Policy.  
 
This statement formally recognised the independence of the RBA from government. Fraser 
(1994) believes there is some evidence to suggest central bank independence is associated 
with a lower inflation rate. However, this does not take into account the complexity of 
monetary policy and the nature of a central bank board. Independence also meant more 
                                                          
23
 We have already seen the role savings plays in the neoclassical growth model. Although investment does not 
have  a permanent growth impact, it can raise per capita income. 
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accountability and transparency, reports and analysis, Parliamentary scrutiny and the 
publication of minutes; focusing the minds of central bankers when faced with important 
economic decisions and reducing political pressure (Cagliarini et al., 2010). After the 
previous two decades with high inflation, the 1990s saw a sharp decline in the rate of 
inflation to the target range of 2.2 percent for the CPI and 1.6 percent for the GDP deflator.  
 
Whilst inflation began to decline to levels not seen in two decades, growth also began to 
pickup leading to the long boom. As is shown in Figure 3.1, growth began to increase 
significantly from early in the 1990s, such that output growth averaged 4.5 percent for the 
latter half of the decade (Treasury, 2001, p. 55). Growth would prove to be resilient even as 
the region experienced the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. There were concerns that the 
fallout would reach Australia, particularly with respect to exports. However, the RBA 
decided not to defend the currency, leading to depreciation. Demand for exports during this 
period remained strong and tied with expansionary fiscal policy; Australia was left relatively 
unscathed (Bell and Quiggin, 2008). This led Paul Krugman to label Australia the "miracle 
economy" (cited Bell and Quiggin, 2008, p. 78).  
 
The Australian economy continued its strong growth performance into the next decade. 
Despite historically close ties to the United States economy, Australia avoided the mild 
downturn in the US (Bodman and Crosby, 2005). In terms of inflation, average growth was 
above the RBA's target range, particularly early in the decade. Part of the reason for the 
pressure was that house prices began to record strong growth (Cagliarini et al., 2010). With 
inflation growing at a relatively stable rate, the economy continued to grow strongly, aided by 
the onset of a mining boom. According to Battellino (2010), Australia's mining boom began 
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in 2005. The growth of the mining sector, although good for growth, placed pressure on the 
"productive capacity and flexibility" of the economy (Battellino, 2010, p. 67).  However, 
what may have been a policy issue at the time, quickly changed with the onset of the global 
financial crisis.  
 
Even though the global financial crisis of 2008 had a significant negative impact on growth in 
the developed world, Australia avoided a recession. As a comparison, GDP growth for the G7 
economies in the March quarter 2009 declined 2.1 percent, in contrast, Australia grew by 0.4 
percent over the same period (Kennedy, 2009). 0.4 The anaemic growth recorded by 
Australia in the March quarter may not have been much, but by 2010, Australia had bounced 
back and recorded growth of 2.3 percent. 
 
Kennedy (2009) identified three reasons for Australia's relatively strong performance. The 
first is the Australian Government's and RBA's quick response to the world recession. The 
government's role in the financial crisis was to formulate a stimulus package of $42 billion 
that was "timely, targeted, and temporary" (Gittins, 2009, par. 10). For its part, the RBA 
began cutting interest rates rapidly from 7.25 percent to 3 percent. The second reason for 
Australia's performance is its close trading relationship with Asia, specifically China. China 
continued to grow continued to grow above nine percent throughout the GFC, fuelling the 
mining boom from 2005 (The Economist, 2011). The final reason was the stability of the 
banking system. According to Henry (2010b), the stability of the banking system in Australia 
is due to the following reasons, low exposure of Australian institutions to high risk assets and 
the quality of the financial regulatory system. Now that we have a reasonable account of the 
history of GDP in Australia, we can turn our attention to capital. 
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Capital Accumulation 
This section will attempt to outline the growth of capital in the Australian economy from 
1960 to 2010. Before we can begin, it is important to define what is meant by capital in this 
thesis. The measure of capital used in this thesis is gross fixed capital formation and is 
defined by the ABS (2000, par. 1) as "the value of acquisitions less disposals of new or 
existing fixed assets". These assets which may be tangible or intangible are themselves 
outputs from production processes and are used in other production periods over periods of 
time longer than one year. In addition, there is public and private gross fixed capital 
formation. Public gross fixed capital formation is divided into public corporations and 
government expenditure. Public corporations are corporations in which the Australian 
government owns a majority share. We can see the trend of gross fixed capital formation in 
Figure 3.5, the rate of capital deepening has increased at an increasing rate from the 1990s. 
Government expenditure of capital has traditionally played a large role in the Australian 
economy.  
Figure 3.5: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Australia, 1960-2010 
 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 5204.0. 
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Figure 3.5: Public Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Australia, 1960-2010 
 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 5204.0. 
In the first four decades of the 20
th 
century the level of public investment was equal to the 
private sector. The composition of total investment has since changed with, public investment 
declining to about a third of the level at the beginning of the century (Boehm, 1993). From 
Figure 3.5, we can see that investment by government corporations has remained relatively 
stable from 1960 to 2010. General government expenditure on the other hand, has seen a 
rapid increase in the level of investment from the 1990s and especially the latter half of the 
2000s. 
 
Otto and Voss (1995) argue that an economic justification for public infrastructure is that 
these projects are public goods. Markets may not provide sufficient amounts of a public good 
because of its non-rival nature. The geographic expanse of Australia reflects its traditional 
public investment priorities, as transport and communication have historically been the most 
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important targets of public investment. Next to these have been the development and 
conservation of resources and the supply of gas and electricity (Boehm, 1993). A significant 
portion of investment in the development of natural resources has been designated for the 
development of water resources and sewerage, due to the dryness of the continent (Boehm, 
1993).  
 
Aside from investment in public goods due to their non-rival nature is the social return they 
may provide (Otto and Voss, 1995). In essence they provide a benefit beyond the individuals 
involved; an example of this is education and its importance has been shown with new 
growth theory in Chapter 2. Investment in education has seen increased since the 1950s as the 
social benefits have become apparent. Prior to the GFC, there were increasing concerns about 
potential bottlenecks in the Australian economy (Henry, 2010a). Claims were made about an 
infrastructure deficit of around AUD 445 billion to over AUD 770 billion. An audit of 
Australia's infrastructure revealed a lack of long term infrastructure planning, with major 
proposals requiring significant development before the assessment process (Henry, 2010a).  
 
The importance of public infrastructure has been highlighted by Otto and Voss (1994; 1995; 
1996). They show investment in public infrastructure plays an important role in the private 
sector. Depending on the methodology used, the elasticity of private output with respect to 
public capital can vary from around 0.20 to 0.40, suggesting significant gains from public 
infrastructure (Otto and Voss, 1994). 
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Figure 3.6: Private Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Australia, 1960-2010 
 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 5204.0. 
Private investment shows a similar pattern to government expenditure, with steep increases 
after 2005 as shown in Figure 3.6. Through the 1950s and 1960s, there was a decline in the 
importance of primary industry in favour of manufacturing. During this period manufacturing 
absorbed almost one-sixth of total investment (Boehm, 1993). However, with structural 
changes which occurred in the 1980s as the Australian economy began to open up, the 
importance of manufacturing was on the decline, with below one-tenth of investment in the 
1980s (Boehm, 1993). The rise of the services sector as a share of GDP has also seen its share 
of investment increase since the 1980s (Boehm, 1993). From 2005, the beginning of the 
mining boom marked the rise of investment in mining. Investment as a share of GDP has 
been significantly higher than previous mining booms, as shown in Figure 3.6 (Battellino, 
2010). 
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The Australian Labour Market 
It is apparent that growth in GDP and Investment (recessions not withstanding) grew steadily 
over the five decades leading into 2010.  We will see that the Australian labour market has 
shown much the same pattern and has become more resilient, an example of this was the 
relatively low unemployment rate during the GFC. However, there have been painful 
adjustments and structural changes in the labour market, when the government embarked on 
its reform agenda. The importance of a healthy labour market is highlighted by the RBA's 
commitment to the maintenance of full employment in Australia (RBA, 2011). The aim of 
this section is to explore the key factors that are thought to have impacted the Australian 
labour market. A number of indicators involved with the labour market including, 
unemployment, structural changes, the gender wage gap and unions will be examined. 
 
Employment and Unemployment 
There have been a number of particularly severe cyclical downturns which have had an 
adverse effect on the Australian labour market. As such, there has been a general upward 
trend in the Australian unemployment rate from the 1970s (Borland and Kennedy 1998). The 
ABS (2011) defines an "unemployed person as someone aged 15 or older who has not 
worked for at least one hour in the last week, who is available for work, and who is actively 
looking for work." Furthermore, "the unemployment rate is the number of employed 
expressed as a percentage of the labour force, where the labour force equals the sum of 
employment and unemployment".  
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Figures 3.7 and 3.8, as well as Table 3.3 show the history of the Australian unemployment. 
As shown in Figure 3.7 and Table 3.3, unemployment during the 1960s was lower on average 
(around two percent), than any period since. As mentioned above, the 1950s and 1960s have 
been called the "golden age", where strong growth was recorded in conjunction with low 
unemployment and stable inflation rates. This period did not last long, however, as Figure 4.2 
shows, unemployment began to rise dramatically in the wake of the stagflation of the 1970s. 
In Figure 4.3, the difference between the labour force and total employment begins to 
separate markedly at in the middle of the 1970s. It is worth noting in Figure 3.9, that the 
number of hours worked followed a relatively linear path upward, even in when 
unemployment began to rise. 
 
Figure 3.7: Australian Unemployment Rate, 1960-2010 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 6202.0. 
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Table 3.3: Summary of Labour Force Statistics, Australia, 1960-2010 
Year 
Labour Force Participation 
Rate (%) 
Employment Rate 
(%) 
Unemployment Rate 
(%) 
1960 59.2 57.8 2.3 
1965 58.9 58.2 1.2 
1970 61.2 60.3 1.4 
1975 61.6 58.8 4.6 
1980 61.0 57.4 5.9 
1985 60.2 55.5 7.9 
1990 63.2 58.8 7.0 
1995 63.1 58.1 8.1 
2000 62.5 58.4 6.6 
2005 63.9 61.3 4.9 
2010 64.0 60.9 5.3 
Source: Ross and Whitfield, 2009, p. 76; ABS, cat. no. 6202.0 
 
There have been debates about the cause of the rise in unemployment in the 1970s. On the 
one hand, it is believed the recession and the strong bargaining position of labour leading to 
higher wage costs was the cause of unemployment (Borland, 1997; Dawkins and Freebairn, 
1997; Gregory, 2000; Cagliarini et al., 2010). On the other, there are some who believe 
demand side effects were the reason for higher unemployment (Ooi and Groenewold, 1992; 
Debelle and Vickery, 1998).  
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Figure 3.8: Labour Force and Total Employment, Australia, 1960-2010 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 6202.0. 
Figure 3.9: Number of Hours Worked, Australia, 1978-2010 
 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 6291.0.55.001. 
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Although the 1970s may have seemed a particularly bad decade for the labour market, there 
was to be no turning point in the 1980s. In fact, conditions continued to deteriorate as shown 
in Figure 3.7 and Table 3.3. Unemployment rose to almost 10 percent early in the decade 
before declining steadily in the latter half of the 1980s, but not to the levels seen in the 
"golden age". According to Le and Miller (2000) and Ooi and Groenewold (2000), the initial 
spike in unemployment was the result of increasing real wage costs and growth in the labour 
market as well as a recession. Dawkins and Freebairn (1997) believe inadequate government 
policy during the early 1980s was also a factor. Advanced payments were made in 
expectation of a mining boom which did not materialise, leaving the country in debt. Borland 
and Kennedy (1998) posit that growth in labour force participation and a decrease in the 
search effectiveness of the unemployed contributed to the jobless rate.  
 
During the latter half of the 1980s conditions improved slightly. Figure 3.8 shows that total 
employment increased in comparison to the labour force from 1985. In response to the 
recession, the Labor government signed the Prices and Incomes Accord with the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (Ross and Whitfield, 2009). The Accord was an attempt to directly 
influence the wages of workers and was seen to be successful, since the effect was to keep the 
real wages of employees down, making it more attractive for employers to hire workers 
(Chapman, 1990; Dawkins 2000). 
 
 Similar to the 1980s, the 1990s also saw the onset of a recession. The labour market began to 
slow down in the early 1990s with unemployment above 10 percent during the worst part of 
the recession as shown in Figure 3.7. Figure 3.8 also shows the gap between total 
employment and the labour force increasing to levels seen in the early 1980s. Dawkins and 
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Freebairn (1997) and Borland (1997) attribute the decline in employment to the recession. 
Additionally, Dawkins and Freebairn (1997) believe tight monetary policy at the end of the 
1980s was a contributing factor. The response to the recession in the 1990s was different to 
the 1980s. While the Prices and Incomes Accords were a centralised system of wage 
bargaining, the next two decades saw the steady deregulation of the jobs market (Ross and 
Whitfield, 2009).  
 
After three decades of relatively high unemployment, the 2000s brought lower 
unemployment to levels not seen since the 1970s. Unemployment decreased to a low around 
four percent in 2008. The participation rate also increased during this period, which can be 
seen as the result of growth in part-time employment, particularly among women (Lewis, 
2006). Deregulation continued during this period, culminating in the Workplace Relations 
Amendment Act 2005 or Work Choices (Ross and Whitfield, 2009). The movement toward 
deregulation can be seen as a response in part to technological change, trade liberalisation 
and globalisation (Dawkins, 2000).  
 
The global financial crisis sparked fears of a significant and prolonged recession and a 
particularly tight labour market. The primary concern for the Federal Government was to 
keep aggregate demand in the economy high to ensure a minimal impact on the 
unemployment rate (Rodgers, 2009). The Federal Government had indicated a forecast of 8.5 
per cent for unemployment, however, that scenario did not eventuate with the unemployment 
rate still relatively low at around 5 five percent (Hyam, 2009). In an effort to maintain a 
strong labour market the Federal Government embarked on a stimulus program. The Federal 
Government believed the stimulus package announced in 2009 was an important component 
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in achieving that goal. Treasury Secretary Ken Henry warned that winding back the stimulus 
package could cause the loss of 100,000 jobs for the 2010 to 2011 period (Rodgers, 2009).  
 
Underutilisation of Labour 
Whilst the impact of unemployment was not as high as forecast, it is likely that the pressure 
had been transferred to labour underutilisation. Labour underutilisation is measured by 
combining official unemployment and underemployment data by the ABS (Ross and 
Whitfield, 2009). Underemployment includes employees who would like to work more but 
are unable to (Lewis, 2006). The Underutilisation rate for Australia was around 12 percent at 
the end of 2010 (ABS, cat. no. 6202.0). This is an increase over previous years during the 
mining boom, when the national underutilisation rate reached a trough of 9.9 per cent in 2008 
(ABS, cat. no. 6202.0). Surprisingly, the average level of hours worked in Australia has 
barely changed over the past four decades, suggesting there may be factors influencing the 
desire to work more, such as overtime pay (Lewis et al., 2006).  
 
Whilst the average hours worked during the week has not changed much since the 1960s, the 
recession has seen a substantial increase in underemployment. The period from the late 1990s 
saw a substantial increase in the aggregate monthly hours worked before the global financial 
crisis occurred in 2008. Although Australian employers did not reduce their workforce to the 
same extent of the US, they may have been hoarding their employees, the effect being 
reduced working hours (Steven, 2009).  
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Structural Change in the Australian Workforce 
The ability for employers to reduce their employees working hours may in part be the result 
of structural changes in the economy. Foremost of these is the continuing shift away from 
full-time to part-time work in the labour market (Lewis et al., 2006). Part-time employment is 
defined as working less than 35 hours during the survey week (Dornbusch et al., 2007, p. 
598). There have been three reasons for the shift, rapid growth of the service industry, a 
structural adjustment in the economy, increased part-time work in each industry (substitution 
effect), and a growth in overall demand for employment (growth effect) (Lewis et al., 2006).  
 
Figure 3.10 shows the growth in part-time employment from the late 1970s. The share of 
part-time employment has experienced steady growth, which has been accelerated by 
recessionary periods. Part-time employment has grown from 15 per cent in 1980 to 29.8 per 
cent in 2009 for Australia (ABS, cat. no. 6202.0). The trend toward a more flexible labour 
market may have reduced the impact the global financial crisis had on unemployment, 
however, it has not prevented another problem as the economy recovers. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Figure 3.10: Growth in Full Time and Part Time Employment, Australia, 1979-80 to 2004-05 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 6202.0. 
 
Skills Shortages 
Better than expected growth in the Australian economy led to fears of an impending skills 
shortage. A quarter of Australian businesses are planning to cut their training by at least 20 
percent and their intake of apprentices by 10 percent over 2010 (ABC, 2009). Former 
Treasury secretary Ken Henry believed the continued comparatively strong growth by the 
Chinese and Indian economies will underpin economic growth in Australia and once full 
employment has been achieved there is likely to be a skills shortage. This may particularly be 
a problem for resource rich WA with pressure for mineral demand from Asia, the skills 
shortage may prove to be a bottleneck for projects in the state (ABC, 2009). The Australian 
labour market tightened for nine out of the 18 occupational groups in 2010 compared with 
2009. The most difficult vacancies to fill in 2010 were the resource professions with only 45 
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percent of vacancies filled (DEEWR, 2010). In response to the tightening of the labour 
market, business had called for a strong skilled migration program in order to relieve the 
pressure (BCA, 2010). In addition, calls were made for the government to focus more 
resources into providing businesses with incentives to increase their intake of apprentices as 
well as their expenditure on training programs (Cratchley 2009).  
 
Gender Wage Gap 
The labour market indicators thus far have focused mainly on combined female and male 
statistics. This hides the problem of continuing disadvantage to women in the workplace. 
From the Equal Pay Case in the 1970s where the principal was "equal pay for work of equal 
value", to the present there have, however, been significant steps forward (Ross and 
Whitfield, 2009, p. 157). The ratio of female to male earnings has seen a significant increase 
in the after the Equal Pay Case where wage discrimination declined from 44 per cent in 1973 
to 13 per cent in 1989 (Borland, 1999).  
 
Nonetheless, some discrimination continued to exist. This is because of the difficulty in 
implementing the equal work for equal value principle in female dominated industries such as 
health, secretaries and personal assistants (Borland, 1999). Another explanation for wage 
discrimination amongst employers is that they have had a tendency to overestimate the quit 
rates of female employees (Lewis cited Borland, 1999). Female workers also have a 
traditionally high ratio of full-time to part-time workers with 45.7 per cent of employed 
women working part time, suggesting the high flexibility of their wage structure can reduce 
the average hours worked per week (ABS 2009). Few industries achieved parity between 
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male and female wage earnings in 2008. At a senior management level, 2 per cent of women 
were chief executives and 8.3 per cent and held board positions as of 2009, which may 
indicate the presence of a glass ceiling effect (Broderick, 2009).  Kidd and Shannon (2002) 
believe that projections allowing for changes in wage structure, an increase in the rate of 
return to human capital skills and women may have a small impact in the future, suggesting 
the options available to policy makers are limited since they are subject to significant 
diminishing returns.  
 
Unions 
Whilst the gender wage gap may be reduced due to increased flexibility in the workplace, 
unions seem be adversely affected by this trend. Union membership has dropped substantially 
since the 1990s when it was 40.5 per cent for all Australian workers (Waddoups, 2005). By 
2010, the percentage of employees who were trade union members in their main job was 18 
percent (ABS, 2010). Broken down between full-time and part-time work, 20 percent of full-
time employees were union members and 14 percent of part-time employees. Figure 3.11 
shows the declining activity of unions. As shown in Figure 3.11, the number of days lost to 
industrial disputes has declined dramatically from the 1980s as the highly centralised wage 
setting system was changed to allow more flexibility. 
 
As mentioned before there has been a substantial shift away from the highly centralised wage 
setting systems before the 1990s to encouraging direct engagement by employer and 
employee in wage negotiations, decreasing the power of unions. Strike activity has also 
declined, Lewis et al. (2006) believe this is due to the Accord, which reduced real wages and 
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encouraged workers to leave unions since they were not able to increase real wages. 
Waddoups (2005) has found that although unions have traditionally had the power to 
influence the wages of the non-union members, this capability has been reduced with 
declining union density, especially in industries where unions have traditionally been strong.  
 
Figure 3.11: Number of Days Lost in Industrial Disputes 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 6321.0.55.001. 
 
 The desirability of unions depends on their impact on the labour market. Drago and Wooden 
(1990) suggest union activity is a better proxy for determining a union's ability to reduce 
turnover and raise productivity. It may be that a union based on the enterprise is more 
successful than one based on the industry as a whole, based on the two criteria previously 
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be as conducive to the exit-voice model of unionism, since they are not likely to be as active 
in a specific firm, opposed to an enterprise based union (Lewis et al., 2006).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined trends in three in the three inputs of the Solow growth model, GDP 
growth, capital and labour. In terms of growth, the Australian economy has proven to be 
resilient in light of the challenges faced in the 1970s and 1980s. Although there have been 
mistakes in policy (e.g. the CAD) which may have had an adverse impact on growth, these 
have largely been corrected. The result of this is that the Australian has experienced the long 
boom from the 1990s. Australia's strength has also been reinforced by its performance 
through the global financial crisis, 2008, where much of the developed world has experienced 
recessionary conditions.   
 
From the perspective of capital accumulation, the private sector has from a position of parity, 
become the country's primary source of investment. This has especially been the case in the 
wake of the mining boom with large increases in investment since its beginning around 2004. 
The final part of this chapter focused on the labour market. As we have seen, there has been 
structural change in the labour market toward part time employment, in part driven by the 
expansion of the services industry. Mirroring the performance of economic growth in the 
country throughout the GFC, the labour market has performed better than was feared at the 
onset of the crisis. Now that we have an understanding of the history of the Australian 
economy through the key inputs of the neoclassical growth model, we can focus on 
Australia's productivity growth and growth accounting.   
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Chapter 4: Australia's Productivity History and 
Growth Accounting  
Introduction 
The previous chapter has explored the three variables which are specified in the Solow (1956) 
growth model found in Chapter 2. As shown in the previous chapter, the Australian economy 
has undergone structural change in order to meet the challenges over the past three decades. 
We have seen how the Australian economy continued growth (albeit at a lesser rate) ahead of 
other OECD countries in the face of the global financial crisis. In the past Australia has 
struggled with productivity growth. According to Baumol's (1986) study, Australia was the 
world leader in terms of output per worker in the 19
th 
century. However, this was not to last, 
as Japan, initially with eight times less output per worker caught up with Australia. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a literature review of productivity growth in Australia 
as well as determining productivity's contribution to growth through growth accounting. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first part of this chapter gives a review of the 
literature on productivity growth in Australia. The second uses the growth accounting method 
developed by Kehoe and Prescott (2002), Conesa and Kehoe (2005), and Hur (2011) to 
estimate the contribution of productivity to Australian growth from 1960 to 2010. Finally, 
concluding remarks discuss the implications for Australia and possible policy solutions to 
improve productivity. As we will see, though there has been debate about the source of productivity 
growth in Australia, there is broad agreement about its necessity.  
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Literature Review on Australia's Productivity Performance 
There has been broad agreement on the need for productivity
24
 growth for the long term well 
being Australia from the government through the public and private sectors as well as 
academia (House Standing Committee on Economics, 2010). The importance of productivity 
growth has been highlighted by the ABS (cited HSCE, 2010, p. 14):  
Key to long term improvements in Australia's living standards is productivity growth and 
therefore enhancing national productivity is one of the basic goals of economic policy. 
 
Supporting this sentiment, Banks (cited HSCE, 2010) believes Australia's productivity 
performance will also affect how well the country recovers from the global financial crisis. In 
addition, the country's productivity growth rate will also determine how the country meets 
longer terms challenges such as an ageing population and climate change. We can see that 
productivity growth will be a key component for the long term growth of Australia; however, 
it is also important to recognise the contribution that low productivity sectors make to the 
community.  
 
The pursuit of productivity growth at all costs may not lead to outcomes with which the 
community is satisfied. According to Eslake and Walsh (2011), GDP can be an incomplete 
measure of wellbeing at best. There are many aspects of wellbeing which are not measured 
by the statistics. Among these factors are (HSCE, 2011, pp. 141-144): 
 Environmental capital (amenity, biodiversity and air quality). 
                                                          
24
 For the purpose of both the first and last section, productivity refers to both total factor productivity and 
multifactor productivity (MFP). Whilst TFP is a true measure of productivity in the economy since it takes into 
account all the factors of production, MFP refers to proxy measure developed to take account of multiple, but 
not all factors (House Standing Committee on Economics, 2010, p. 11). 
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 Social capital (social attachments, community involvement, safety and risk). 
 Per capita income (consumption and saving, funding of social activities and funding 
of institutions, such as law and order). 
In light of these considerations, there may be situations where the pursuit of productivity 
growth is not acceptable to the community. An example of this may be the temptation to 
move capital and labour from industries with low productivity (health, retailing, education or 
hospitality) to industries with high productivity (mining, finance and insurance). We can say 
that there is a trade off between allocative efficiency and productivity growth (Eslake and 
Walsh, 2011). Whilst these considerations are important, productivity growth still represents 
the best chance for continued long term growth. Now that we have an understanding of the 
tension between productivity growth and factors outside the statistics, we can focus on a 
literature review of productivity growth thus far in Australia.  
 
According to Banks (2003, p.2), Australia's productivity growth in the 20
th
 century can be 
divided into three phases. The first of these is relatively fast growth in the 1950s through to 
the mid-1970s; secondly, a slowdown through to the early 1990s and finally a strong 
resurgence which has recently begun to taper off. The structure of this section follows these 
phases. 
 
The 'Golden Age' and 1970s Productivity Growth Deceleration 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the post war years from the 1950s to the beginning of the 
1970s are referred to as the "golden age". This period reflected "pent-up demand, reduced 
constraints on supply and freer international movements of capital, people and technology" 
(Banks, 2003, p. 2). From an international perspective, Australia's GDP per hour was about 
81 percent of the USA's as well as ranking fourth out of a group of 22 developed or high-
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income countries (Parham, 2002a). Looking back at Australia's position in the 19
th
 century, 
we can see that Australia's position as one of the world leaders in productivity began to 
decline. Table 4.1 shows the decline in Australia's ranking as a productivity leader compared 
to the performance of the United States and Canada. Although the US showed only a slight 
decline from the 1950s to 1970s, Australia's decline was more dramatic. Indeed, as Europe, 
Japan and Korea began a productivity growth catch-up, Australia's ranking had slipped to 
twelfth (Banks, 2003). The decline in ranking may seem alarming; however, it is possible 
geographic circumstances inhibit Australia's productivity potential. 
Table 4.1: International Ranking of United States, Canada and Australia on Average Income, 
Labour Productivity and Labour Utilisation, 1950-2001 
 1950 1973 1990 2001 
 Rank %US Rank %US Rank %US Rank %US 
GDP per capita (1996 $US)      
USA 2 100 2 100 1 100 1 100 
Canada 4 80 4 87 3 86 6 78 
Australia 5 78 9 74 15 74 7 78 
GDP per hour worked (1996 $US)      
USA 1 100 2 100 5 100 5 100 
Canada 2 95 4 91 9 88 13 83 
Australia 4 81 10 74 15 77 14 83 
Labour utilisation Annual Hours worked per capita     
USA 14 100 11 100 4 100 2 100 
Canada 20 86 18 96 5 97 6 94 
Australia 16 96 7 104 6 96 5 94 
Source: Parham, 2002a, p. 54.  
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For much of the past 50 years, Australia's Labour productivity level has been around 80 
percent of the USA's. Even in periods where Australia recorded comparatively strong 
productivity growth, the net effect was to achieve the 80 percent level of labour productivity. 
According to Battersby (2006), it is possible that Australia has been the victim of natural 
circumstances. Australia may be the victim of a "tyranny of distance" (Blainey cited 
Battersby, 2006). Geographic remoteness increases the cost of trading, lowering the extent of 
international trade as well as providing natural protection for local industries.  
 
According to Battersby and Ewing (2005), when these factors are taken into account, 
Australia's productivity performance may be quite strong. Davis and Rahman (2006) 
attributed the difference in productivity levels with the amount of physical capital per worker, 
human capital, microeconomic policies and the geographic and historical context within 
which they operate. The US workforce has also had a historically more educated workforce 
(Eslake and Walsh, 2011). In light of these circumstances, is it possible Australia may be able 
to catch up to the US in the future? Dolman, Parham and Zheng (2007) believed even under 
very optimistic assumptions regarding six industries they measured, Australia will not catch 
up in the following decades. Although Australia may be inhibited by its natural 
circumstances, the decline in productivity growth by the mid-1970s was alarming for policy 
makers.  
 
Australia experienced a pronounced deceleration of productivity growth from the late 1970s 
through to the early 1990s (Banks, 2002). By the 1990s Australia's ranking for productivity 
performance had dropped to 15
th
. The Australian government conducted a series of economic 
and policy reviews in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s in an attempt to remedy the decline in 
94 
 
productivity growth. Similar to the reasons for the rise of stagflation, the causes of the decline 
in productivity growth were found to be (Parham, 2002a, p. 54): 
highly regulated product, capital and labour markets and the inefficient provision of 
economic infrastructure (including electricity, gas, water, communications and transport). 
Government owned enterprises dominated economic infrastructure and their (poor) 
performance was determined in large part by political overlays on their operations. 
 
From these economic and policy reviews, Australia embarked on an extensive reform 
program from the early 1980s aimed at improving the country's poor productivity 
performance.  
 
1990s Productivity Surge 
Australia's historically poor productivity growth record experienced a rebound in the 1990s. 
The strength of the surge in productivity growth is reflected by the fact that Australia 
outperformed the USA and the OECD for the first time (Banks, 2002; Parham, 2002a). In 
addition to being greater in magnitude, Australia's productivity rebound in this period also 
began earlier than the US (Parham, Roberts and Sun, 2001). In terms of per capita income, 
Australia raised its ranking from 15
th 
to seventh in 2001 (Agbenyegah, 2007, p. 44). The key 
microeconomic and macroeconomic reforms of the past three decades are outlined in Table 
4.2, as well as the key features of the cycle. As shown, Australia's productivity began to 
increase in the early 1990s before surging in the late 1990s. Aside from the steep decline in 
productivity growth in 1999 in Figure 4.1, Australia's productivity growth was strong for 
much of the decade leading into 2000. Much of the research into the productivity surge has 
focused on the microeconomic and macroeconomic reforms outlined in Table 4.2 (HSCE, 
2010).  
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Table 4.2: Growth Rates and Economic Reform backdrop for Productivity Cycles, Australia, 
1981-2008 
Productivity 
Cycle 
Average MFP 
Growth Rate 
Key 
Microeconomic 
Reforms 
Key 
Macroeconomic 
Reforms  
Other features 
of the cycle 
1981-82 to 
1984-85 
1.1 Deregulation of the 
financial market 
1983 
Floating $A 
December 1983 
 
Original Accord 
February 1983 
Mining Boom 
 
Recession 
1984-85 to 
1988-89 
0.8 Entry of foreign 
banks 1987 
 
Increased exports 
 
Award restructuring 
& removal of 
demarcations 
Accord III: 
efficiency offsets 
for wage rises 
March 1987 
Wall Street Crash 
October 1987 
1988-89 to 
1993-94 
1.0 Tariff reductions 
1988-1991 
 
Quota and subsidy 
reductions 
Compulsory 
national 
superannuation 
scheme introduced 
 
Accord VII: 
enterprise 
bargaining October 
1991 
Recession 1990-92 
 
Immigration 
1993-94 to 
1998-99 
2.3 Tariff reduction 
Nov 1996 
 
National 
Competition Policy 
Introduced 
 Asian Financial 
Crises 1997-98 
 
Australia's growing 
services sector 
 
Late 1990s China's 
rapid urbanisation 
and industrialisation 
1998-99 to 
2003-04 
1.1  Goods and Services 
Tax July 2000 
Dot-Com Crash 
March 2001 
 
Terrorist attacks on 
US September 2001 
 
Australian 
Resources Boom 
from 2003- 
2003-04 to 
2007-08 
Incomplete 
cycle 
-0.3  Workchoices 2006 Chinese growth rate 
13 percent 2007 
 
Collapse of Lehman 
Bros Bank Sept 
2008 
 
Global Financial 
Crisis 2008- 
 
RBA cash rate falls 
96 
 
200 basis points 
Sept-Nov 2008 
Source: House Standing Committee on Economics, 2010, p. 6. 
 
We have seen in Chapter 2 how much of the debate around productivity has focused on 
technology, however, this may not be the only source of growth. Banks (2002) believes a 
significant proportion of productivity growth within Australia during the 1990s came from 
the reduction in inefficiencies rather than new technology. Microeconomic reform has played 
an important role in improving productivity in the Australian context as well as giving insight 
into the source of productivity growth (Banks, 2002, p. 10): 
 Advances in technology are not the only source of productivity growth. 
 It is the rate of uptake of technology (not the mere existence of advances) that matters 
for improving productivity. 
 Other facilitating changes within firms are required to get the full potential out of new 
technologies.  
Adding weight to the claim reforms played a large part in the productivity surge, Parham 
(1999; 2003) notes that although capital growth had been strong, it was not on par with the 
historical standards of the 1960s and 1970s.  
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Figure 4.1: Total Factor Productivity's Contribution to Growth, Australia, 1995 - 2010
a 
 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 5260.0.55.002, 
a 
Quality adjusted hours worked basis. 
Parham (2002b) believed the microeconomic reforms provided an adequate explanation for a 
checklist of productivity facts. The first of these is that the timing of the productivity 
improvement does coincide with the timing of the regulatory reforms. Secondly, the length 
and the strength of the productivity improvement have come from restructuring and 
modernising production in a catch-up to the rest of the world. Third, the underlying influence 
of reforms, at least circumstantially, can be found in the wholesale trade, finance and 
insurance and utilities industries. In addition, reforms which were aimed at opening up 
domestic and international markets increased firm specialisation and intra industry trade 
(Parham, 2002a). Finally, and as mentioned above, labour productivity gains have come not 
from capital deepening, but growth in MFP.  
 
Although there has been broad agreement about the effect of microeconomic reform, some 
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(1998) believed the pickup in productivity growth can be attributed to international openness, 
factor prices, capital intensity, human capital and infrastructure investment as well as 
international competitiveness. These conclusions are shared by Chand (1999), Salgado 
(2000), Mahadevan (2002), Valadkhani (2003), HSCE (2010), OECD (2010), Treasury 
(2010) and IMF (2011).  
 
There has been a rebuttal of the view that microeconomic reforms were important by Quiggin 
(2001, cited HSCE, 2010). These are based on the timing of the reforms and the change in 
ABS methodology used for measuring MFP. According to Quiggin (cited HSCE, 2010, p. 
40): 
the extent of any contribution to productivity growth from microeconomic reform over the 
period since 1980 is too small to be distinguished from other fluctuations in the time series. 
 
The productivity estimates had also been revised down from 2.4 percent to 1.7 percent a year. 
Quiggin (cited Parham, 2002b) believed the revised estimates demonstrate that the 1990s did 
not experience a productivity surge. This has been refuted by Parham (2002b), who noted all 
the productivity estimates were revised downward and that the 1990s were still a period of 
comparatively strong productivity growth. There was also contention that Quiggin's views 
may be too simplistic and that there were additional factors outside of the reforms which 
contributed to the productivity surge (HSCE, 2010).  
 
Whilst the microeconomic and macroeconomic reforms of the period were important in 
raising Australia's productivity growth, they were not the only contributors. In conjunction 
with the reforms over the past three decades, an increase in human capital and rapid take up of 
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information and communication technology (ICT) also played a role in the productivity 
growth surge. Estimates of the effect of ICT on productivity vary wildly, although there is 
agreement about the positive impact the technology had on productivity growth. The 
Manufacturing Alliance (cited HSCE, 2010, p. 41) believes ICT take up and diffusion account 
for almost 30% of productivity growth. Parham et al. (2001) using year-to-year estimates 
believe the contribution of IT capital deepening emerged in 1995-96. Their estimates show 
the timing of the contribution was remarkably close to the US, however, they believe the 
Australian contribution was slightly stronger.  
 
The OECD (2010) along with Parham (2002b) conclude the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s 
combined with the take up of ICT were responsible for the productivity surge. Parham 
(2002b) also wrote that high levels of education played a role as he showed the skill level of 
an economy and the absorption of ICTs are interrelated. Additionally, the reforms which 
opened the economy to competitive pressures both domestically and internationally have 
been crucial in driving the uptake and smart use of ICTs. Downplaying the role ICTs have 
had on productivity growth, the Productivity Commission believes its impact has been 
"insignificant" compared to microeconomic reform (PC cited HSCE, 2010, p. 42).  
 
Decade in Decline 
By the mid-2000s, Australia's productivity surge in the 1990s proved to be just that. As 
shown in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1, productivity has been in steep decline through the latter 
half of the decade. Despite the decline in productivity growth, GDP growth continued at a 
relatively strong pace, especially in the face of the GFC. Some of the reasons for the decline 
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in productivity growth are that there had been a slowdown in the micro reform agenda (Table 
4.2), bottlenecks constraining growth and supply side issues. Inflation also increased as spare 
capacity is being used up and private sector wages were running well ahead of labour 
productivity (IMF, 2011). 
 
There has also been structural change in the economy, as shown in Chapter 3, the services 
sector has expanded rapidly. This may also have had an impact on the outcome of MFP 
estimates as half of the services sector is not counted (HSCE, 2010). From a sectoral 
standpoint, the decline in productivity growth appears to be the result of perverse trends in 
the mining, utilities and agriculture sectors (Eslake and Walsh, 2011). Mining in particular 
has seen a sharp rise in inputs since the beginning of the mining boom driven by demand for 
resources by emerging economies.  
 
What separates the mining boom which began in 2005 from pervious booms is that 
investment as a share of GDP has been significantly higher (Battellino, 2010). This is 
reflected by the fact that the real value of mining capital stock has increased by almost 80 
percent over the past decade. Hours worked in the mining sector also more than doubled over 
the same period. The high price of commodities has driven Australia's prosperity over the 
past decade as the terms of trade have 65 percent from 2003 to mid-2008 (HSCE, 2010; 
Banks, 2010; OECD, 2010; IMF, 2011). High commodity prices may also be reason why 
mining companies have pursued lower grade mining sites (Eslake and Walsh, 2011).   
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Even though the effect of the mining boom was positive for Australia in terms of GDP 
growth, real output from the sector has only increased by 37 percent (Eslake and Walsh, 
2011). Although the large investment in inputs from the mining sector has lead to a decline in 
Australia (-0.3 percent for 2003-2008), it is possible there may be an improvement in the 
future due to investment lags. Topp, Soames, Parham and Bloch (2008) believed up to a third 
of the decline in mining productivity between 2000-01 and 2006-07 is due to these lags, with 
the effect being more pronounced in the latter years. Once more projects start to come on 
stream and output increases; there may be an increase in the productivity growth rate. 
However, this is expected to take longer than previous mining booms due to the projected 
ongoing investment at high rates (HSCE, 2010).  
 
The pattern of investment in the mining sector is similar for electricity, gas and mining 
(EGW). Utilities have experienced a 73 percent increase in the number of hours worked, as 
well as a rise in the value of the real capital stock by 35 percent over the past decade. Output 
in the sector has only increased by 15 percent (Eslake and Walsh, 2011). The EGW sector 
recorded substantial productivity growth in the 1990s in response to institutional reforms 
legislated by State Governments. The period from 2000 to 2010 saw substantial investment in 
the electricity sector to meet demand, replace ageing infrastructure and meet renewable 
energy targets (Eslake and Walsh, 2011). Drought has played a role in the decline of 
productivity growth in the water sector. In response to the drought State Governments have 
imposed restrictions and increased investment in water infrastructure (desalination plants) in 
order to guarantee water security (Eslake and Walsh, 2011).  
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Agricultural productivity has also suffered in the wake of the drought. Agriculture has 
traditionally been strong performer in terms of productivity growth since the 1970s with more 
than twice the rate achieved compared to the rest of the market sector (Productivity 
Commission, 2005). The sector has benefited from microeconomic reforms, good weather 
conditions, advances in technology, new crops, increased water efficiency, larger farms and 
growth in human capital (HSCE, 2010; Jackson, 2010). However, this trend has changed with 
agriculture detracting about one percent per annum from aggregate productivity growth 
(HSCE, 2010). As mentioned above, drought is one of the reasons for the decline, others 
include; a slowdown in the spread of technology, technological progress has slowed and 
research priorities have changed away from productivity (Jackson, 2010). Now that we are 
aware of Australia's productivity trends, we can turn our attention to growth accounting.  
 
Empirical TFP Estimations, Australia, 1960-2010 
The growth accounting methodology used in this thesis follows the methods put forward by  
Kehoe and Prescott (2002), Conesa and Kehoe (2005), and Hur (2011). The first step in 
growth accounting according to this framework is to construct a capital series using the 
Perpetual Inventory Method: 
                , (4.1) 
where   is a constant deprecation rate of capital and    is real investment at time t. For the 
purposes of this thesis,   is 0.04 (Agbenyegah, 2007).  
 
This framework uses the Cobb-Douglass production function:  
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     (4.2) 
where    is output,    is total factor productivity,    is capital input,    is labour input all at 
time t. We can now divide (4.2) by the civilian population 15 years and older,   . This 
enables us to decompose the evolution of output according to the following expression: 
 
  
  
   
 
    
  
  
 
 
   
 
  
  
   (4.3) 
In this form, output per working age person,      , decomposes into a productivity factor, 
  
     
, a capital factor,        
     , and a labour factor,      . This decomposition 
allows us to calculate the TFP series: 
    
  
  
   
     (4.4) 
Along a balanced growth path, when    grows at a constant rate, the capital-output ratio, 
     , and the participation rate,      , are constant.  
 
The statistics used for the construction of the TFP series are as follows; gross domestic 
product for output (ABS, cat. no. 5204.0), gross fixed capital formation for capital (ABS, cat. 
no. 5204.0), the labour force for labour (ABS, cat. no. 6202.0) and civilian population 15 
years and older for    (ABS, cat. no. 6202.0).
25
 Both GDP and gross fixed capital formation 
are chain volume measures adjusted for inflation with 2009 as the base year. The capital 
share of income is represented by   and labour share of income    . This thesis will use 
four measures of   in order to compare and contrast the results. The four measures of   are 
                                                          
25
 These statistics are explained in detail in Chapter 3. 
104 
 
      (Otto, 1999; Dornbusch et al., 2007),       (Gollin, 2002),      (Pink, 2007) and      
(ABS, cat. no. 5260.0.55.002).
26
 The results are displayed below:
27
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 The   values 0.44 and 0.47 are based on MFP estimates. 
27
 Tabulated data is located in the appendix.  
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Figure 4.2: Growth Accounting Decomposition (α = 0.255) 
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Figure 4.3: Growth Accounting Decomposition (α = 0.3) 
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Figure 4.4: Growth Accounting Decomposition (α = 0.44) 
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Discussion 
As we can see, the contribution of productivity to economic growth varies depending on the 
value of   used. It is important to note that capital's contribution to growth may be larger 
where   is 0.44 and 0.47 due to the fact that these measures of capital share of income are 
based on MFP estimates. As discussed before, MFP estimates only cover half the services 
sector, which in turn overestimates capital's contribution to growth. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show 
the capital-output ratio and participation rates as relatively constant, suggesting Australia is 
on a balanced growth path. If we examine Figures 4.4 and 4.5, the picture changes 
dramatically.  The capital-output ratio increases significantly over the course of the 1980s to 
2010, where capital's contribution has increased to     percent with an   value of     . 
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Figure 4.5: Growth Accounting Decomposition (α = 0.47) 
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Productivity still made a contribution to growth, but not to the extent seen in Figures 4.2 and 
4.3. 
 
Although the contribution productivity makes to growth may differ in extent, it does follow 
broadly the same trend across the four figures. In addition, productivity growth generally 
follows the same pattern as outlined in the literature review. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the 
Australian economy demonstrated relatively strong productivity growth at the height of the 
"golden age". TFP contributed      percent (         and      percent (        during 
this period. Productivity growth begins to flatten out from the mid-1970s and even decline 
with a trough of      percent           in 1983, as tightly regulated markets and 
inflexible nature of the economy began to show signs of strain.   
 
We can also see evidence of the productivity surge in the 1990s across the four graphs. 
Where   is smaller (0.255 and 0.3), the contribution of productivity to growth is more 
pronounced as the effect of economic reforms, ICT and increase in human capital begin to set 
in. Also consistent with the literature is the decline in productivity Australia has begun to 
experience over the past decade. Again, the extent of the decline is more pronounced as the 
value of   increases; the contribution of productivity to growth is       (          and  
               for 2010, but the decline is shown across the four graphs. Now that we 
have seen the decline in productivity is consistent between growth accounting conducted in 
this thesis as well as the literature, two questions are relevant. What does the future hold for 
Australia if productivity growth does not pickup and which policies may help remedy the 
decline in productivity? 
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Reinvigorating Australia's Productivity Growth 
From a purely theoretical perspective, the neoclassical growth model does not suggest a 
means for improving long term productivity growth. As mentioned in Chapter 2, productivity 
is treated as "manna from heaven". A possible solution may be to increase the rate of savings, 
however, that is only a temporary measure. It is also important to revisit the debate on TFP 
covered in Chapter 2, when examining Australia's decline in productivity. The argument 
made by accumulationists was that growth in the East Asian Tigers was driven primarily by 
growth in factor inputs (for example, Krugman, 1994). Young's (1994) estimates of TFP 
ranked Singapore at 63 behind countries such as Egypt, Pakistan and Botswana. However, as 
Taylor (2007, p. 33) explained:  
Since the mid-1990s, Singapore has not only experienced one of the highest growth rates in 
the world but it is also one of the world's richest countries in terms of per capita income. 
None of the above-mentioned group of countries displayed any signs of converging towards 
the living standards of advanced nations at the speed experienced by Singapore. On this 
basis alone, a high TFP does not necessarily translate into high economic growth. 
 
Solow's (2000) observations on the convergence debate about the ability of a nation to utilise 
technology and its institutional frameworks are also relevant. As noted above, Australia has 
been particularly successful at utilising technology in the form of ICTs and has also been 
praised on its institutional frameworks by the OECD (2010).  
 
It is possible the accumulationists may be right about TFP and its relevance to long term 
growth. As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, there was a steep increase in capital formation in the 
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decade beginning in 2000. It is possible as Singh (1998) has suggested that capital investment 
represents a new vintage of technology, which is not simply a copy of its previous iteration. 
As we have seen, one of the sectors contributing to the decline in productivity, mining, may 
improve its performance due to investment lags associated with their projects. Although 
productivity growth may return in the future, Banks (2010), the OECD (2010) and IMF 
(2011) believe the prudent course of action is to pursue productivity growth, instead of 
waiting for it to return at some point in the future.
28
 
 
As mentioned above, Australia's productivity growth has not only stalled but declined in the 
period leading up to 2010. The challenge for Australia is not to become complacent in the 
face of rising income despite the decline in productivity growth. Australia has experienced 
the same pattern with a two speed economy before; mining (Japanese influence on coal and 
iron ore) produces a windfall of wealth and increases domestic spending on non-traded goods 
industries. The windfall from these sectors induces real appreciation of the currency and 
squeezes other traded goods industries (Banks, 2010; Eslake and Walsh, 2011). The 
importance of productivity growth has been demonstrated by Davis and Rahman (2006). If 
productivity growth is 0.5 percent higher than the 1.75 percent per annum assumed in the 
Commonwealth of Australia Intergenerational Report, then Australia's economy will be up to 
20 percent larger in the next 40 years. Whilst productivity growth is important for the long 
term growth of the economy, other factors have made a contribution to the long term growth 
rate in the past.  
 
                                                          
28
 As noted before, this does not mean the pursuit of productivity growth for the sake of productivity growth. 
There may be important considerations outside official productivity statistics which the public value above 
reform and productivity enhancing measures.  
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Henry (2002) wrote that Australia's long term growth in the past has been dependant on three 
factors; population, participation and productivity. The following equation shows how these 
factors contribute to productivity growth (Eslake and Walsh, 2011, p. 12): 
                 
          
          
 
           
          
 
   
           
  
The greatest contributor to GDP growth in the past 40 years has been productivity growth 
with 2 percent, followed by population growth at 1.5 percent and finally participation 
contributing 0.25 percent (Henry, 2002, p. 19). Over the next 40 years, population growth is 
forecast to contribute about half of the 1.5 percent in the past, with the ageing population 
contributing only marginally. On the other hand, labour force participation is expected detract 
from growth, with the unemployment rate and average working hours only having a marginal 
impact on growth (Henry, 2002, p. 20). The Federal Government (Treasury, 2010, p. xii) 
recognises the challenges ahead: 
With the ageing of the population reducing participation, productivity growth will be the 
major contributor to real GDP per person growth in Australia over the next 40 years. 
Productivity growth is also believed to be particularly important with regard to the budget 
and the pressure an ageing population will have on the country's finances. Expanding the 
growth potential of the economy will improve budget revenues without increasing the tax 
burden on the economy (Treasury, 2010). Whilst increasing productivity growth over the next 
40 years is a priority for the government, achieving this will be harder said than done, 
especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.  
 
According to Kelly (cited Banks, 2010, p. 1), the historic post-1983 reform agenda is 
terminated. If the reform agenda is to be restarted it must take place in the post-GFC world. 
The Commonwealth budget is under strain after the GFC, which limits the extent to which 
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the Federal Government can reward State Governments for good reform (Banks, 2010). 
Therefore, cooperation between State and Federal Governments will be particularly 
important. The OECD (2010) believes many of the challenges facing the Australian economy 
are inter-jurisdictional in nature. Despite pressure being placed on the budget throughout the 
GFC, the institutional frameworks are in place to ensure the reform agenda can be restarted. 
As the OECD (2010, p. 7) states, "Australia represents a "role model" for OECD countries in 
its approach to regulatory reform". The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has well 
designed frameworks for assessing national regulatory proposals, however, these frameworks 
need to be strengthened (OECD, 2010). Banks (2010) believes reforms which deserve 
priority are those which reduce business costs and enhance supply side responsiveness.  
 
In addition to ensuring the reform process continues, there are a range of other policies and 
measures which may improve productivity performance. As mentioned above, the Federal 
budget is constrained in the wake of the global financial crisis. This puts a limit on the extent 
to which government can promote productivity growth through spending and investments 
such as infrastructure and human capital (Banks, 2010). According to Banks (2010), 
proposals to improve productivity performance without significant expenditure include; 
improvement in government procurement, especially in programs such as defence which 
favour high cost local production. In addition, tighter selection processes for infrastructure 
programs which do not yield a public benefit and human services, where benchmark data 
suggest room for more cost-effective delivery. The Treasury (2010), HSCE (2010) and 
Eslake and Walsh (2011) argue for similar proposals to Banks (2010). Eslake and Walsh 
(2011) also believe tax reform and a focus on improving innovation (which has stalled) may 
be important.  
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Although Kelly (cited Banks, 2010) claimed the reform process from the Federal 
Government is dead, Eslake and Walsh (2011) have suggested firms may also have a role to 
play in productivity growth. According to the Telstra Productivity Indicator (Telstra, 2010), 
the "productivity gap" between firms widened in the lead up to 2010.
29
 The "productivity 
gap" is defined as the "difference between the significant number of enterprises that 
acknowledge productivity as a priority and the limited capabilities of most to accurately 
measure and manage productivity improvements" (Telstra, 2010, p. 5). Only 42 percent of 
leaders can articulate their organisation's productivity targets in 2010, a decline from 49 
percent in 2009. The result of this is that the productivity gap has widened from 29 to 34 
percent. Furthermore, it was found that many organisations believe productivity is a whole of 
organisation issue. Those which assign direct responsibility for productivity to individuals or 
teams were more likely to execute productivity enhancing programs and monitor 
performance.  
 
Conclusion 
It is apparent from this chapter that Australia is well placed to face the challenges of the 
future. I began this chapter with a literature review of Australia's productivity performance 
from 1960 to 2010. In the 1960s and 1970s Australia had relatively strong productivity 
growth with limited demand and reduced constraints on supply in the golden age of growth. 
The mid-1970s were a period of introspection for Australia as a number of reviews 
determined the need to deregulate, reform and open the economy. Beginning in the 1980s, the 
                                                          
29
 The report surveyed 300 enterprise and government leaders, with the leaders representing firms with over 
200 employees.  
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reform period contributed to the productivity surge Australia experienced through the 1990s. 
The final phase examined is the productivity decline over the past decade, with substantial 
improvements in the terms of trade contributing to the rise in GDP growth.  
 
The second part of this chapter focused on performing growth accounting for the Australian 
economy from 1960 to 2010. Productivity across the four   varied in extent, but the trend 
was similar in each of the four graphs. Furthermore, the trends shown in the growth 
accounting followed the productivity trends outlined in the literature review. The final section 
of this chapter examined what the future may hold for the Australian economy in light of the 
productivity decline. We can see the importance of productivity growth by the fact that an 
additional 0.5 percent growth per annum means the economy will be 20 percent larger over 
alternative projections. Even though productivity growth may be depressed in the current 
period, the Australian government has recognised the need to encourage productivity growth.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to achieve two goals. The first was a review of the literature on the 
neoclassical growth model. As shown in the review, the neoclassical growth model has been 
the focus of extensive research. I began by examining the six "stylised facts" of growth 
according to Kaldor with particular focus on what constituted a steady state. Second, the 
Cambridge capital controversy was covered. The controversy questioned the manner in which 
capital was aggregated and its suitability for use in growth theory. Additional arguments were 
made about reswitching and capital-reversing. Although the debate was spirited, it ended with 
both sides believing they had won. Whether or not the debate has been "buried" as Cohen and 
Harcourt (2003) claim, time will tell.  
 
One of the areas which gained prominence in growth theory was convergence. Although 
there was no evidence to support the absolute convergence, there was some support for 
conditional convergence. Opposition to supporters of convergence found that there was 
instead evidence of divergence. It was claimed that those who reported evidence of 
conditional convergence had their samples biased by the fact that they chose countries on an 
ex post basis. Nevertheless, Solow (2000) did not find the literature on convergence 
particularly interesting, noting factors outside models of growth which may account for 
differences in cross country wealth.  
 
The failure of cross country convergence on a wide scale led to the focus on TFP. The 
debate's primary focus was on factors which led to the rapid growth of per capita income in 
East Asia and their prospects for the future. Accumulation theories concluded that the rise of 
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East Asia was the result of a rapid increase in factor inputs. The fact that there was a decline 
in productivity growth in these countries and that TFP estimates were close to zero showed 
these countries were close to their steady state. On the other hand, accumulation theories 
claimed that the increase in inputs (especially capital) may have been a source of productivity 
growth. Issues were also found with measurements and methodologies. Regardless of the 
measure of TFP used, many of the East Asian nations continued to grow at a rate higher than 
those close to the top of Young's (1994) estimates, as Taylor (2007) noted.  
 
The final section of the literature review focused on placing the neoclassical growth model in 
context. Although growth theory as a research topic died down in the 1970s, it picked up 
again with the development of new growth theory. Solow (2000) has noted that the focus of 
these growth theories was not on technical progress, but on abandoning the assumption of 
diminishing returns to capital. Later models attempted to give an account of technical 
progress by noting the effect human capital, openness to trade; spillover effects and creative 
destruction have on the rate of technical progress. Although Solow (2000) acknowledges the 
role these theories have played in expanding knowledge of growth, he believes they assume 
too much about the nature of technological progress.  
 
The second aim and thesis was to give an account of TFP growth for Australia from 1960 to 
2010 and in doing so update the literature. I began by giving a history of three factor inputs 
which are used to determine TFP. Australia's GDP growth from 1960 to 2010 was generally a 
period of expanding wealth. Recessions in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s gave way to an 
extended boom from the mid-1990s which lasted through the beginning of the GFC. In terms 
of capital accumulation, the trend has been for capital deepening, particularly in the period 
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from 2005-2010. The labour market, aside from the recession in the early 1990s, has 
generally been strong, whilst at the same time undergoing extensive structural change.  
 
In terms of productivity growth, there has been broad agreement about the factors which have 
contributed in the past. Whilst Australia is unlikely to achieve a productivity level similar to 
the US due to geographic considerations, it has performed relatively well from 1960 to 2010. 
Of particular interest to researchers was the productivity surge experienced in the 1990s, with 
the reasons being attributed to microeconomic and macroeconomic reforms and the rapid take 
up of ICTs. In the last decade being studied, Australia experienced a reversal in productivity 
growth, due to increases in factor inputs (i.e. capital investment from mining and EGW) and a 
drought which affected agricultural productivity.  
 
The growth accounting method developed by Kehoe and Prescott (2002), reaffirmed the 
trends Australia experienced from 1960 to 2010. Particularly noticeable was the productivity 
surge of the 1990s, and depending on the value of   being used, the decline from the mid-
2000s. As noted, policy makers are aware of the decline in productivity growth and are 
investigating means to improve growth.  
 
On its own, the Solow growth model does not suggest a remedy for declining technical 
progress since productivity is treated as "manna from heaven". Increasing savings may shift a 
country above its steady state, but is only temporary. An alternative view of TFP suggests 
technical progress is embodied in new vintages of capital. Furthermore, Young's (1994) TFP 
estimates placed the East Asian Tigers near zero, suggesting steady state growth had been 
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achieved. Nevertheless, these countries continued to experience growth rates above those at 
the top of Young's (1994) rankings. Does this suggest Australia does not need to worry about 
productivity growth for future growth? Indeed, the investment lags associated with mining 
investment suggest productivity may improve in the future. According to Banks (2010), 
however, the prudent course of action is to pursue productivity growth in light of challenges 
Australia is expected to face in the future.  
 
Henry's (2002) analysis of the long term growth of Australia suggests population, 
participation and productivity have been the primary drivers. However, forecasts suggest two 
of the three P's (population, participation and productivity) will either make no contribution 
(population) or a negative contribution (participation). This leaves productivity growth to 
pick up the slack. A number of proposals have been put forward to encourage productivity 
growth. Emphasis has been placed on the need for regulatory reform, which stalled in the 
decade leading into 2010 (Banks, 2010; OECD, 2010). As noted, Australia is well placed in 
this area and is regarded as the "role model" in terms of reform. Additional areas for reform 
include tax and reviewing government frameworks in procurement and expenditure (HSCE, 
2010). At an organisational level, leaders can contribute to productivity growth with a greater 
focus on productivity, to minimise the productivity gap (Telstra, 2010). The recognition of 
policy makers on the importance of productivity growth has placed Australia in a position of 
strength to meet the long term challenges of the future.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Growth Accounting Decomposition          , Australia, 1961-2010 
Year 
Per Capita 
RGDP 
Capital's 
Contribution 
Labour's 
Contribution 
TFP 
1961 0.33  0.52 -1.05 0.87 
1962 -0.79  0.95 -0.75 -0.98 
1963 4.06  -0.72 0.16 4.65 
1964 6.19  -0.90 0.25 6.88 
1965 3.69  -0.45 0.88 3.24 
1966 -0.44  0.83 1.81 -3.02 
1967 4.13  -0.36 0.33 4.16 
1968 2.88  0.00 0.13 2.74 
1969 4.46  -0.54 -0.04 5.07 
1970 4.67  -0.55 1.61 3.58 
1971 1.30  0.41 -0.22 1.11 
1972 1.85  0.38 0.54 0.92 
1973 0.65  0.75 0.37 -0.47 
1974 1.88  0.22 -0.31 1.98 
1975 -0.46  1.15 0.34 -1.93 
1976 0.96  0.38 -0.49 1.08 
1977 1.64  0.08 0.82 0.73 
1978 -1.83  0.95 -1.96 -0.81 
1979 2.37  -0.12 -0.87 3.40 
1980 1.25  0.38 1.61 -0.73 
1981 1.33  0.22 -0.57 1.68 
1982 1.12  0.51 -1.08 1.71 
1983 -4.07  2.50 -0.54 -5.90 
1984 2.81  -0.29 0.30 2.79 
1985 3.19  -0.42 0.62 2.98 
1986 2.34  -0.09 1.50 0.92 
1987 0.43  0.61 0.26 -0.43 
1988 3.70  -0.58 0.46 3.83 
1989 2.03  0.13 1.79 0.11 
1990 1.89  0.42 0.89 0.57 
1991 -1.64  1.61 -0.99 -2.23 
1992 -0.80  0.99 -0.22 -1.55 
1993 2.87  -0.41 -0.92 4.25 
1994 2.71  -0.28 0.49 2.49 
1995 2.50  -0.21 1.51 1.18 
1996 2.53  -0.10 0.08 2.55 
1997 2.49  -0.05 -1.54 4.15 
1998 2.66  -0.17 0.07 2.77 
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1999 3.93  -0.23 0.14 4.03 
2000 2.42  0.17 -0.25 2.51 
2001 0.51  0.88 0.33 -0.70 
2002 2.35  -0.09 -0.03 2.46 
2003 1.67  0.26 0.30 1.10 
2004 2.61  0.22 -0.25 2.64 
2005 1.62  0.71 1.01 -0.11 
2006 1.50  0.71 0.60 0.19 
2007 1.29  0.65 -0.06 0.69 
2008 1.53  0.56 1.11 -0.14 
2009 -0.78  1.50 0.24 -2.48 
2010 0.48  1.06 0.10 -0.68 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 5204.0; ABS, cat. no. 6202.0 
 
Table 2: Growth Accounting Decomposition        , Australia, 1961-2010 
Year 
Per Capita 
RGDP 
Capital's 
Contribution 
Labour's 
Contribution 
TFP 
1961 0.33  0.65 -1.05 0.74 
1962 -0.79  1.19 -0.75 -1.21 
1963 4.06  -0.91 0.16 4.84 
1964 6.19  -1.12 0.25 7.12 
1965 3.69  -0.56 0.88 3.36 
1966 -0.44  1.04 1.81 -3.22 
1967 4.13  -0.45 0.33 4.26 
1968 2.88  0.01 0.13 2.74 
1969 4.46  -0.68 -0.04 5.22 
1970 4.67  -0.68 1.61 3.72 
1971 1.30  0.51 -0.22 1.01 
1972 1.85  0.47 0.54 0.83 
1973 0.65  0.94 0.37 -0.66 
1974 1.88  0.27 -0.31 1.92 
1975 -0.46  1.45 0.34 -2.21 
1976 0.96  0.47 -0.49 0.98 
1977 1.64  0.10 0.82 0.71 
1978 -1.83  1.19 -1.96 -1.04 
1979 2.37  -0.15 -0.87 3.43 
1980 1.25  0.48 1.61 -0.82 
1981 1.33  0.28 -0.57 1.62 
1982 1.12  0.63 -1.08 1.58 
1983 -4.07  3.13 -0.54 -6.48 
1984 2.81  -0.36 0.30 2.86 
1985 3.19  -0.53 0.62 3.09 
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1986 2.34  -0.11 1.50 0.94 
1987 0.43  0.77 0.26 -0.59 
1988 3.70  -0.73 0.46 3.98 
1989 2.03  0.16 1.79 0.07 
1990 1.89  0.53 0.89 0.47 
1991 -1.64  2.02 -0.99 -2.62 
1992 -0.80  1.24 -0.22 -1.80 
1993 2.87  -0.51 -0.92 4.36 
1994 2.71  -0.35 0.49 2.57 
1995 2.50  -0.26 1.51 1.23 
1996 2.53  -0.12 0.08 2.58 
1997 2.49  -0.07 -1.54 4.16 
1998 2.66  -0.22 0.07 2.82 
1999 3.93  -0.29 0.14 4.09 
2000 2.42  0.21 -0.25 2.46 
2001 0.51  1.11 0.33 -0.92 
2002 2.35  -0.11 -0.03 2.49 
2003 1.67  0.33 0.30 1.03 
2004 2.61  0.28 -0.25 2.58 
2005 1.62  0.89 1.01 -0.29 
2006 1.50  0.89 0.60 0.01 
2007 1.29  0.81 -0.06 0.53 
2008 1.53  0.70 1.11 -0.28 
2009 -0.78  1.88 0.24 -2.84 
2010 0.48  1.33 0.10 -0.94 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 5204.0; ABS, cat. no. 6202.0 
 
Table 3: Growth Accounting Decomposition         , Australia, 1961-2010 
Year 
Per Capita 
RGDP 
Capital's 
Contribution 
Labour's 
Contribution 
TFP 
1961 0.33  1.19 -1.05 0.20 
1962 -0.79  2.19 -0.75 -2.18 
1963 4.06  -1.65 0.16 5.64 
1964 6.19  -2.04 0.25 8.13 
1965 3.69  -1.02 0.88 3.84 
1966 -0.44  1.91 1.81 -4.05 
1967 4.13  -0.83 0.33 4.65 
1968 2.88  0.01 0.13 2.74 
1969 4.46  -1.24 -0.04 5.82 
1970 4.67  -1.25 1.61 4.31 
1971 1.30  0.93 -0.22 0.58 
1972 1.85  0.87 0.54 0.43 
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1973 0.65  1.73 0.37 -1.43 
1974 1.88  0.50 -0.31 1.69 
1975 -0.46  2.67 0.34 -3.38 
1976 0.96  0.86 -0.49 0.59 
1977 1.64  0.19 0.82 0.62 
1978 -1.83  2.20 -1.96 -2.02 
1979 2.37  -0.28 -0.87 3.56 
1980 1.25  0.87 1.61 -1.21 
1981 1.33  0.51 -0.57 1.39 
1982 1.12  1.17 -1.08 1.05 
1983 -4.07  5.82 -0.54 -8.85 
1984 2.81  -0.65 0.30 3.17 
1985 3.19  -0.97 0.62 3.55 
1986 2.34  -0.21 1.50 1.03 
1987 0.43  1.41 0.26 -1.22 
1988 3.70  -1.33 0.46 4.62 
1989 2.03  0.30 1.79 -0.06 
1990 1.89  0.97 0.89 0.03 
1991 -1.64  3.73 -0.99 -4.23 
1992 -0.80  2.28 -0.22 -2.80 
1993 2.87  -0.93 -0.92 4.81 
1994 2.71  -0.64 0.49 2.87 
1995 2.50  -0.48 1.51 1.46 
1996 2.53  -0.23 0.08 2.68 
1997 2.49  -0.12 -1.54 4.22 
1998 2.66  -0.40 0.07 3.00 
1999 3.93  -0.53 0.14 4.34 
2000 2.42  0.38 -0.25 2.29 
2001 0.51  2.04 0.33 -1.82 
2002 2.35  -0.20 -0.03 2.58 
2003 1.67  0.60 0.30 0.75 
2004 2.61  0.51 -0.25 2.35 
2005 1.62  1.63 1.01 -1.02 
2006 1.50  1.63 0.60 -0.73 
2007 1.29  1.49 -0.06 -0.15 
2008 1.53  1.28 1.11 -0.86 
2009 -0.78  3.48 0.24 -4.34 
2010 0.48  2.45 0.10 -2.03 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 5204.0; ABS, cat. no. 6202.0 
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Table 4: Growth Accounting Decomposition         , Australia, 1961-2010 
Year 
Per Capita 
RGDP 
Capital's 
Contribution 
Labour's 
Contribution 
TFP 
1961 0.33 1.35 -1.05 0.05 
1962 -0.79 2.47 -0.75 -2.45 
1963 4.06 -1.86 0.16 5.87 
1964 6.19 -2.30 0.25 8.42 
1965 3.69 -1.15 0.88 3.98 
1966 -0.44 2.16 1.81 -4.28 
1967 4.13 -0.93 0.33 4.76 
1968 2.88 0.01 0.13 2.74 
1969 4.46 -1.40 -0.04 5.99 
1970 4.67 -1.41 1.61 4.48 
1971 1.30 1.06 -0.22 0.46 
1972 1.85 0.98 0.54 0.32 
1973 0.65 1.95 0.37 -1.65 
1974 1.88 0.57 -0.31 1.62 
1975 -0.46 3.02 0.34 -3.70 
1976 0.96 0.98 -0.49 0.48 
1977 1.64 0.21 0.82 0.59 
1978 -1.83 2.48 -1.96 -2.29 
1979 2.37 -0.32 -0.87 3.60 
1980 1.25 0.99 1.61 -1.32 
1981 1.33 0.58 -0.57 1.32 
1982 1.12 1.32 -1.08 0.90 
1983 -4.07 6.59 -0.54 -9.52 
1984 2.81 -0.74 0.30 3.26 
1985 3.19 -1.10 0.62 3.68 
1986 2.34 -0.23 1.50 1.06 
1987 0.43 1.59 0.26 -1.40 
1988 3.70 -1.50 0.46 4.80 
1989 2.03 0.33 1.79 -0.10 
1990 1.89 1.10 0.89 -0.10 
1991 -1.64 4.22 -0.99 -4.68 
1992 -0.80 2.58 -0.22 -3.08 
1993 2.87 -1.05 -0.92 4.93 
1994 2.71 -0.73 0.49 2.95 
1995 2.50 -0.54 1.51 1.52 
1996 2.53 -0.26 0.08 2.71 
1997 2.49 -0.14 -1.54 4.24 
1998 2.66 -0.45 0.07 3.05 
1999 3.93 -0.60 0.14 4.42 
2000 2.42 0.43 -0.25 2.24 
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2001 0.51 2.30 0.33 -2.07 
2002 2.35 -0.23 -0.03 2.61 
2003 1.67 0.68 0.30 0.68 
2004 2.61 0.58 -0.25 2.28 
2005 1.62 1.85 1.01 -1.23 
2006 1.50 1.84 0.60 -0.93 
2007 1.29 1.69 -0.06 -0.34 
2008 1.53 1.44 1.11 -1.02 
2009 -0.78 3.94 0.24 -4.76 
2010 0.48 2.77 0.10 -2.33 
Source: ABS, cat. no. 5204.0; ABS, cat. no. 6202.0 
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